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By decision of 27 April 1976, the Bureau of the European Parliament 
authorized the Committee on Budgets to submit to Parliament a motion for 
a resolution on certain budgetary questions arising from the inter-
institutional dialogue agreed to when the 1976 draft budget was adopted. 
The ad hoe working party of the Committee on Budgets, chaired by 
Mr Cointat, adopted its report for the committee at its meeting of 
Monday 5 April 1976; the Committee on Budgets appointed Mr Cointat 
rapporteur and adopted this report at its meeting of 5 April 1976. 
On 28 April 1976 the Committee on Budgets unanimously adopted a 
motion for a resolution to accompany the report, which now forms the 
explanatory statement. 
Present: Mr Lange, chairman; Mr Cointat, rapporteur; Mr Artzinger, 
Lord Bruce of Donington, Mr Brugger, Mr Clerfayt, Mr Dalyell, Mr Fabbrini, 
Mr Fletcher, Mr Lautenschlager, Mr Notenboom, Mr Patijn, Mr Radoux, 
Mr Schmidt and Mr Shaw. 
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A 
The committee on Budgets hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on 
the inter-institutional dialogue on certain budgetary questions 
The European Parliament 
- having regard to the inter-institutional agreement reached when the 
1976 budget was adopted and with a view to joint r.onsideration of 
certain budgetary questions; 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (Doc. 97/76); 
1. Approves the conclusions reached by the ad hoe working party of the 
committee on Budgets as set forth in the explanatory statement in 
this report. They may be resumed as follows: 
- the budget must set out all Community revenue and expenditure 
(including loans and credits relating to financial cooperation 
with the developing countries). 
- the budget must set out all forseeable expenditure for the 
financial year under consideration (thus making supplementary 
budgets an exceptional occurrence); 
- the budget should continue to be produced yearly while allowing 
for the financing of multi-annual projects (notably by means of 
commitment appropriations); 
- the budget should be presented as clearly as possible (by means 
of clear budget entries and nomenclature); 
2. Instructs the Committee on Budgets and its working party to pursue 
the inter-institutional dialogue in accordance with these conclusions; 
3. Firmly hopes that this dialogue will enable the institutions concerned 
to reach agreement on the main questions before the opening of the 
budgetary procedure for the 1977 budget; 
4. Instructs its president to forward this resolution and the report 
of its committee to the Council and the Commission of the European 
communities. 
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I. GENERAL COMMENTS 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
(Report of the ad hoe working party) 
During both the work on the review of the budgetary provisions of the 
Treaties and the procedure for the adoption of the 1976 budget, Parliament 
and the Council agreed on the need to pursue and intensify their dialogue 
on a number of questions raised by the essential changes in the nature and 
role of the Communities' budget. 
When Parliament's supplementary report on the 1976 budget was adopted, 
Parliament and the Council agreed to begin this dialogue in the first quarter 
of 1976. This consultation should make it possible to consider all the main 
problems posed by the changing character of the Connnunities' budget: 
- Parliament's budgetary powers: further development of these powers within 
the framework of the current revision of the Treaties and with a view to 
the future election of Parliament by direct universal suffrage; 
- budgetary resources: full implementation of the own resources system 
through the introduction of Community VAT from 1 January 1977; 
- budgetary procedure: decision on a pragmatic procedure for adopting the 
budget similar to that followed for the 1976 budget - changes in the budget-
ary timetable in line with the new requirements which became apparent in 1975: 
- budgetary technique: improvement of certain technical aspects of the 
budget including: 
1. bud;Jeti.zation of loans; 
2. bu:lgetization of financial cooperation appropriations and the EDF; 
3. commitment appropriations; 
4. supplementary budgets; 
5. budgetary nomenclature; 
6. budgetary transparency. 
At its meeting of 18 November 1975 the Committee on Budgets agreed, on 
a proposal from its chairman, to set up an 'ad hoe working party on certain 
budgetary matters'. 
As the working party's main task was to consider the various technical 
aspects of the budget referred to above, it was composed of members of the 
Committee on Budgets, who had acted as rapporteurs on the Community budgets 
or who had specialized in the matters under consideration. 
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Mr COINTAT (rapporteur on the 1976 budget) was appointed chairman of the 
working party, which also included: 
Mr LANGE (chairman of the Committee on Budgets); 
Mr AIGNER (rapporteur on the 1975 budget), to report on supplementary 
budgets; 
Miss FLESCH (joint rapporteur on the 1976 budget), to report on the 
budgetization of financial cooperation appropriations and the 
EDF; 
Mr GERLACH (rapporteur on Parliament's estimates for 1975), to report on 
budgetary transparency; 
Mr LAGORCE (rapporteur on EURATOM loans), to report on the budgetization 
of loans; 
Mr~ (who took over from Mr POUNDER as rapporteur on the 1974 budget 
and acted as rapporteur on commitment appropriations), to report 
on commitment appropriations. 
It was agreed that the working party would meet during the first 
three months of 1976 and submit its conclusions to the Committee on 
Budgets in time for the dialogue with the Council due to begin during 
the first fortnight of April. 
In accordance with its terms of reference, the working party held 
seven meetings and adopted working documents on each of the six subjects 
listed above. 
On 5 April 1976 the working party adopted the whole of the present 
report and, on the same day, its chairman formally submitted it to the 
Committee on Budgets. 
The working documents are included in the report in the form in 
which they were finally adopted by the working party. Their main 
conclusions are first briefly summarized by the working party's chairman. 
0 
0 0 
II. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
In considering the conclusions of the various working documents, it 
is important to bear in mind the objectives which the working party set 
itself. 
In view of the radically changing character of the Community structure, 
the nature and function of the budget must be regularly adapted to new 
political and financial realities. 
- 7 - PE 44_071/fin. 
This must be done by the budgetary authority itself, with the 
assistance of the Commission. It is right and indeed essential that 
the two institutions constituting the budgetary authority should be 
able to exchange information on a virtually permanent basis'and confer 
together on questions of current importance to the Community. Ideally, 
the dialogue on matters of principle should be planned so as not to 
coincide with the main events in the budgetary calendar, i.e. when the 
day-to-day reality of the debate on the draft budget inevitably takes 
precedence over other considerations. In this way, a good many 
difficulties and misunderstandings would be avoided during the 
budgetary procedure itself. 
In this connection, the working party's task was to undertake a 
thorough examination of certain questions which, though apparently of a 
technical nature, are in fact of fundamental importance for the 
development of the Community budget. These questions were not chosen at 
random; they had of necessity to be examined by the working party 
because of their current importance and their implications for the 
nature of the budget. 
In the course of its study, the working party constantly bore in 
mind the three aims which Parliament has consistently sought to achieve, 
namely: 
- to adapt changes in the budgetary technique to the. necessary 
strengthening of its powers in this area; 
- to secure compliance with the fundamental principles of 
budgetary law which are generally recognized in the Member 
States and which confirm the ultimate right of Parliament to 
authorize and control expenditure; 
- to ensure that the budget, which must be a working tool as 
closely adapted as possible to Community needs, is regularly 
reviewed. 
0 
The conclusions finally reached by the working party may seem 
disconcertingly simple, but are the more convincing for being so. 
Essentially, the various working documents conclude that: 
- the budget must record all Community revenue and expenditure 
(including loan operations and appropriations earmarked for 
financial cooperation with the developing countries); 
- the budget must record all foreseeable expenditure for the 
financial year under consideration (the need for supplementary 
budgets would then only arise in very exceptional circumstances); 
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- the principle of the annuality of the budget must be maintained, 
but at the same time permit the financing of multi-annual projects 
(particularly through the device of commitment appropriations); 
- the budget must be as clear as possible (through the transparency 
of its entries and the use of intelligible nomenclature). 
As is shown more fully in the ensuing paragraphs, the practical 
expression of Parliament's budgetary powers is conditional upon 
observance of these principles. 
0 
Brief summary of conclusions 
1. Bud2etization_of_loans 
(a) all the Community's oorrowing and lending operations must 
be recorded in the budget; 
(b) the principle of such operations and their financial ceiling 
must be approved each year by the budgetary authority; 
(c) as with non-compulsory expenditure, it must be Parliament 
which ultimately decides whether such approval should be 
given. 
2. Bud~etization_of_financial_cooFeration_aFfrOfriations_and_the_EDF 
(a) all agreements negotiated with the developing countries and 
having financial implications must be referred to Parliament 
before their conclusions; 
(b) all appropriations earmarked for the financing of cooperation 
agreements with the developing countries must be included in 
the budget; 
(c) Parliament must be more closely involved in the management 
and control of EDF operations; 
(d) EDF operations must be budgetized by the time the present 
Lorn~ Convention expires at the latest. 
(a) the principle of the annuality of the Community budget must 
be respected, but the budget must also permit the financing 
of multi-annual projects through the wider use of 
commitment appropriations; 
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(b) there must be a single unified provision for commitment 
appropriations, whose use must be based on more detailed multi-
annual estimates; commitment a~propriations must be subject to 
an annual authorization based on, but not rigidly determined by, 
the multi-annual estimates; 
(c) extension of the use of commitment appropriations must be 
accompanied by a marked reduction in the use of non-automatic 
carry forwards. 
4. Supplementary budgets 
(a) the initial budget must make a genuine attempt at forecasting 
expenditure, so that supplementary budgets need only be 
introduced in the financial year to finance expenditure 
requirements which are both unforeseeable and unavoidable;, 
(b) foreseeable expenditure must include even those items on which 
no formal legialative decision has yet been taken; 
(c) full use must be made of any procedure - in particular the 
provisional appropriations procedure - which would make it 
possible to avoid using supplementary budgets; 
(d) in most cases, rectifying budgets could be used instead of 
supplementary budgets. 
5. Bud2etari_nomenclature 
(a) the budgetary nomenclature must be regularly revised so as to 
make the procedure for authorizing expenditure as clear as 
p9ssible; 
(b) changes to the nomenclature must be made by the budgetary 
authority and may be jointly agreed upon by the Council and 
Parliament before the opening of the budgetary procedure 
itself; failing such agreement, the ultimate decision rests 
with Parliament, as in the case of non-compulsory expenditure; 
(c) Parliament proposes that, before the opening of the 1977 
budgetary procedure, various improvements should be made to 
both the 'vertical' and the 'horizontal' presentation of the 
nomenclature. 
(a) The decentralization of certain Commission agencies must be 
strictly limited to cases where this is necessitated by 
administrative circumstances and should not be allowed to 
restrict the scope of the budgetary authority's control; 
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(b) the decentralization of such agencies must not, in principle, 
affect the position of their staff, who must be covered by the 
general provisions applicable to Community personnel, i.e. they 
must be included on the general establishment plan and be 
subject to the Staff Regulations; 
(c) such agencies must be in a position to provide the budgetary 
authority with meaningful information in regard to their costs 
and cost effectiveness; their external activities (e.g. contracts 
concluded with third parties) must remain under the control of 
the budgetary authority; 
(d) the various financial provisions governing these agencies will 
have to be unified, possibly by means of a general financial 
regulation common to them all. 
0 
0 0 
Means of giving effect to these conclusions 
Depending on their nature, these conclusions may be given effect, either 
through the simple informal assent of the budgetary authority, or through 
amendments to texts currently in force, and to the Financial Regulation in 
particular, or through a decision taken unilaterally by Parliament: 
(a) buaie~zation_of_loans_and_of_financial_cooperation_with_the 
developin2_countries: the assent of the budgetary authority 
will alone suffice to establish the principle of the 
budgetization of this expenditure. Under the 1977 budgetary 
procedure, Parliament could adopt amendments requiring the 
budgetization of cooperation appropriations, but the procedure 
proposed for the budgetization of loans will probably have to 
be laid down in the Financial Regulation; 
(b) bud2etization_of_the_EDF: a number of texts currently in 
force will have to be revised if the EDF is to be budgetized 
while the present C0nv~~tion is in operation; the future EDF 
may be budgetized on the basis of a formal inter-institutional 
agreement; 
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(c) commitment_appropriations: the relevant Commission proposal, 
which envisages amendments to the Financial Regulation's 
provisions on these appropriations, will have to be modified 
in order to accommodate the working party's proposals; 
(d) supplementary budgets: an agreement of principle by the 
Council and Parliament may suffice; 
(e) ~~~~~~!~~~~~: an agreement here may be reached before the 
opening of the 1977 budgetary procedure; failing such 
agreement, however, the changes sought by the working party 
could be made through the adoption of amendments to the 1977 
draft budget; 
(f) budgetary transparency: a joint agreement between the 
budgetary authority and the Commission on the principle of 
having decentralized departments and on their use would seem 
to be necessary; the introduction of an outline financial 
regulation for these departments might also be considered. 
0 
Once the budgetary authority has been briefed by the Commission, it is 
essential that it should reach agreement on these importan~ questions as a 
matter of urgency - even if it is obliged to act in advance of the revision 
of the Financial Regulation. Such an agreement would do much to facilitate 
the debate on the 1977 draft budget and its approval and would keep alive 
the spirit of pragmatic cooperation which prevailed throughout the 1976 
budgetary procedure. 
0 
0 0 
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III 
BUDGETIZATION OF COMMUNITY LOANS 
Draftsman: Mr LAGORCE 
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INTRODUCTION 
The different Conununity loan mechanisms 
1. Like national states and certain international organizations, the 
European Communities have the right to borrow and to lend capital. This 
right is not derived from a general capacity to borrow but on various texts 
which confer upon certain Community bodies various possibilities of borrow-
ing and lending. The legal situation is thus one of diversity and it is 
matched by practices which, from the point of view of strict financial and 
budgetary orthodoxy, are somewhat confused. It will be enough to recall 
briefly the four types of loan, varying widely in kind, which already exist 
within the Conununity; 
- !!~_!2!~~: the European Investment Bank is empowered by the Treaty 
of Rome to obtain funds from the capital market for the purpose of 
'contributing to the development of the conunon market in the 
interests of the Community'; 
- ECSC_loans: the High Authority is empowered by the Treaty of Paris 
to contract loans 'to procure the funds it requires to carry out 
its tasks'; 
1 
- ·~etroidollar'_loans: instituted by a regulation of 17 February 
1975, these are intended to enable the Community to borrow funds 
for the exclusive purpose of re-lending to Member States experiencing 
balance of payment difficulties caused by the increased price of 
petroleum products; 
- Euratom_loans: the Euratom Treaty expressly authorises this 
community to borrow capital for the purpose of financing research 
or investment in the nuclear sector. This proposal for a regula-
tion, which is in the process of adoption by the Council, introduces 
a borrowing procedure to help finance nuclear power stations. 
The need to coordinate this machinery 
2. These four kinds of loan exist side by side and up to now Community author-
ities do not appear to have studied in depth how they might be coordinated. 
These loans involve large sums of money, estimated at 4,927 m u.a. 3 This 
figure should be compared with that of the total Community budget, namely 
6,268 m u.a. 4 for the 1975 financial year. 
1 Officially referred to as 'Community borrowings': the term 'petro-dollar 
loans' is used here to avoid confusion with .the general concept of Community 
loans. 
2 OJ No. L 46, 20.2.75, p. 1 
3 This amount is broken down as follows: 
4 Including three supplementary budgets 
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ECSC loans 
EIB loans 
Euratom loans : 
Petro-dollar loans: 
597 mu.a. 
830 mu.a. 
500 m u.a.tx,mnal) 
3 , OOO m u • a -6')(Jn.inal) 
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3. Moreover, the Commission is presently considering the creation of new 
machinery for raising loans to finance export credits (in the context of a 
'European export bank') as well as credits for regional development and for the 
development of certain Community industrial sectors (such as the aviation 
sector). 
4. Borrowing on the capital market undoubtedly provides a method of 
financing which is both necessary and desirable for certain Community 
policies: necessary, because the limitations of specifically budgetary res-
ources are becoming increasingly obvious especially as a result of the 
difficult economic situation in the Community today; desirable, because 
loans provide a flexible and modern technique, particularly suited to 
financing the type of industrial investments in which the Community intends 
to play an increasing part. 
5. But more expansive borrowing on the capital market requires that the 
limits of this policy should be dra~n as clearly and as precisely as pos-
sible. In other words the legal, technical and political framework of 
community borrowing must be more strictly defined. 
The role of the European Parliament 
6. It is only natural that Parliament should be espEcially concerned with 
the political context of this activity. Borrowings are as much a part of 
Community resources as budget appropriations proper; the loans which are 
the contra-items to these borrowings constitute a form of Community expendi-
ture which, like the appropriations entered in the budget, permit the 
development of common policies. It is Parliament's responsibility to con-
trol, in the broad sense of the term, the overall ceiling of Community 
expenditure and to make sure that its borrowing position is secure. More-
over, the powers which Parliament presently enjoys do not allow it to play 
a genuine part in the development of common policies except by way of 
authorization of expenditure, that is to say through its authority in 
budgetary matters. 
The budqetization of loans 
7. For this reason, Parliament has recently insisted that Community 
borrowing should, as far as possible, be reflected in the budgetary frame-
work, pointing out at the same time that budgetization was also desirable 
for technical reasons. The clearest expression of this desire is to be 
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found in its resolution of 19 June 19751 
'3. Considers that, in line with the relevant legal rules, 
an entry should be made in the annual budget to cover Community 
borrowings and lendings, which should be subject to the budgetary 
procedure applicable to all Community revenue and expenditure 
and that the Commission must therefore be empowered by the 
budgetary authorities to borrow funds and to approve loans of 
sums to be accurately defined and set out in the budgetary docu-
ments; ' 
8. In present circumstances, the budgetization of the borrowing and 
lending by the EIB is clearly neither possible nor even desirable; 
however, the precise determination of their field of operation and their 
coordination with other forms of borrowing are matters which have now 
acquired a certain urgency. 
9. Furthermore, particularly in view of the wider autonomy granted to 
the Commission by the Treaty of Paris, the legal provisions now in force 
do not allow the budgetization of ECSC loans. Nonetheless Parliament 
has gradually succeeded in being associated with the preparation, 
management and control of the ordinary EISCbudget and this should in 
time include ECSC borrowing activity. Moreover, as in the case of the 
EIB, Parliament should ensure proper coordination between EC:C and other 
Community borrowings. 
10. For the moment, therefore, the question of budgetization chiefly 
concerns Euratom and petro-dollar borrowings~ although it should be 
remembered that it will also concern the new forms of borrowing mentioned 
earlier, and now under consideration, once they are introduced. 
1 Opinion on the proposal for a Council Decision empowering the 
Commission to issue Euratom loans with a view to a Community 
contribution towards the financing of nuclear power stations. 
OJ C 157, 14.7.1975 p. 35. 
- 16 - PE 45.071/fin. 
EURATOM AND PETRO-DOLLAR LOANS 
Difficulties in putting the machinery into operation 
11. It should be remembered that the difficulties so far experienced in 
putting the two mechanisms concerned into operation have been mainly due to 
the Council's obvious reluctance. 
The regulation on raising Euratom loans for financing the construction 
of nuclear power stations has still not been issued, even though the formal 
proposal by the Commission dates from 18 December 1974: the question of 
budgetization and that of EIB participation in the procedure appear to be 
the cause of this delay. 
Furthermore, there is some uncertainty over the 'petro-dollar loans': 
Member States with balance-of-payment difficulties did not exactly rush to 
apply for these loans while the Council beat long about the bush before 
authorizing the Commfssion to sound out the financial markets to obtain the 
necessary petro-dollars. 
Budgetization within the framework of the 1976 budget 
12. These difficulties notwithstanding, both borrowing mechanisms, as well 
as those still under consideration, should soon become operational; it is 
therefore essential for Parliament to begin discussing the principle and the 
form of their budgetization. The resolution of 15 June 1975, already referred 
to, clearly states the principle of this budgetization. It was applied by 
Parliament itself during the vote on the 1976 draft budget; despite Council 
opposition and going beyond the position adopted by the Commission, Parliament 
decided that Euratom and petro-dollar borrowings should be included in the 
budget under both revenue and expenditure - and introduced, by way of amend-
ment, the corresponding budgetary lines1 , inserting token entries in the 
appropriate columns. 
13. Both the wording of the resolution of 16 June 1975 and that of the amend-
ments2 showed that Parliament did not consider the token entry as the best 
way to meet the requirements of budgetization. 
1Euratom loans 1Petrodollar loans 
- Revenue, Art. 944 - Revenue, Art. 945 
- Expenditure, Art. 329 - Expenditure, Art. 4Bo 
2PE 42.881 and PE 42.887 
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The token entry simply means, firstly, that the Commission has been 
authorized in principle to borrow and to lend in accordance with each financial 
mechanism and, secondly,that creditorsare given the assurance that the 
Community budget will in all circumstances guarantee repayment of the loans. 
14. This system does not seem satisfactory in that the budget gives no 
figure for intended borrowing and lending operations. Parliament therefore 
takes no decision on this figure and has no means of advance control over the 
size of the transactions involved and hence over the development of the 
common policies which they make possible, The only power left to it is that 
of the veto; if Parliament totally disapproves a particular loan it can 
prevent the Commission from raising it by replacing the token entry by a dash 
(-), under both receipts and expenditure. 
It cannot be objected that the regulations instituting these loans have 
themselves set limits to their scope: Parliament cannot accept that the 
amount of borrowings - no more than that of ordinary expenditure - should be 
predetermined by basic regulations on which it can only deliver an opinion, 
even if this opinion can, in certain circumstances, take the form of a con-
sultation procedure; the annual amount of bqrrowings and !endings should be 
governed by a budgetary decision in which Parliament should be associated 
under the procedure laid down in Article 203 of the EEC Treaty. 
THE PURPOSE OF BUDGETIZATION 
15. In Parliament's opinion, the form in which loans are budgetized should 
allow two complementary goals to be realized: 
the involvement of the budgetary authority in the determination of 
the financial ceiling for loan operations, 
- the grouping, in the annual budgetary document, of the principal 
figures involved. 
Setting the financial ceiling 
16. In practice neither the Commission nor the budgetary authority is able 
to determine with accuracy, before the beginning of the financial year in 
question, the capital sums which can be borrowed on the European and inter-
national markets - no more than it can calculate the exact amount of the 
loans which will be requested by the bodies and enterprises concerned. 
Nonetheless the budgetary authority can specify, by means of the budget, 
the maximum amount which the Commission will be authorized to borrow and lend 
during the financial year in question under each of the existing loan mechan-
isms. The budgetary authority would then determine, on the basis of foresee-
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able possibilities and requirements in the sectors under consideration, tle 
maximum amount of capital which could be borrowed and later lent by the 
Commission. 
17. The way the two budgetary authorities will share the power to author .ze 
loans remains to be determined. During the revision of the Treaties, th! 
Commission envisaged that the decisions to raise loans should be taken by 
the Council, with the assent of Parliament, during the budgetary procedur ,. 
Although Parliament approved this provision it was not passed by the 
Council. Thus even after revision, Article 203 does not allow some form 
of co-decision, unless Parliament and the Council arrive at a sort of 
gentleman's agreement on the matter. 
On the other hand, from a legal point of.view, Parliament could, und, r 
Article 203, unilaterally set a ceiling on borrowing and !endings: 
Parliament's budgetary powers are limited only where the volume of expend .. -
ture is concerned and in this case there is no genuine expenditure involv, d. 
18. The setting of a financial ceiling raises a further problem: the 
inclusion in the body of the budget of sums intended for borrowing and 
lending, whereas the budget in principle only shows appropriations intend, d 
to cover actual expenditure. In national budgets, this difficulty is 
usually overcome by entering these operations in a separate, though 
integral part of the budgetary document: they are usually entered 
'below the line', that is to say after the ordinary budget. It is this 
sort of presentation that is proposed below. 
Grouping loans 
19. In order to coordinate and rationalize the various loan mechanisms, 
it would seem advisable to include once a year in the budget all 
operations relating to the management of Community borrowing. 
This would provide the budgetary authority - when it comes to decide 
the annual ceiling on borrowing and lending - with a convenient and 
overall view of Community borrowing, enabling it to gauge the probable 
impact of its budgetary decision on the situation. 
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TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF BUDGETIZATION 
20. In view of the objectives and constraints described above the best solu-
tion would be to enter borrowings and !endings in the budget in two different 
places: 
- in the body of the budget 
- in an annex to the budget entitled 'EEC capital budget.' 
In the budget 
21. Borrowing and lending activities would be shown in the Commission's 
budget in their proper place, i.e.: 
- for revenue: in chapter 94 of the revenue section which groups all 
the proceeds from borrowings and from the reimbursement of 
loans: each loan mechanism would be identifiable and entered 
separately. 
- for expenditure: loans raised would be shown in the chapters relating 
to the common policy which it is intended to finance: for 
example Euratom loans would be shown in chapter 32, 'Expenditure 
in the industrial and energy sectors' - regional loans in 
Chapter 55, 'Regional fund,' etc ••• 
22. Loans would be listed as three separate· entries under both revenue and 
expenditure: 
Revenue 
1. Proceeds from loans raised 
2. Reimbursement of loans 
granted by the EEC 
3. Reimbursement of financial 
and banking costs 
Exeenditure 
1. Loans granted by the EEC 
2. Reimbursement of loans raised 
by the EEC 
3. Financial and banking ~osts 
In both cases a token entry should be made under 1 in order, as explained 
above, not to encumber the budget with purely capital operations such as the 
raising and granting of loans by the Community. 
On the other hand, entries 2 and 3 should show the real annual repayments 
on loans raised and granted as well as the corresponding financial and banking 
costs. 
23. These three entries should be accompanied by observations giving the 
necessary legal and technical information. 
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For example, the observation opposite entry 1 should state the legal 
basis - in practice the regulation - for raising or granting the loan. It 
should also indicate that the token entry is an authorization from the budget-
ary authority to borrow and to lend. 
Opposite entry 2 'expenditure' it might be specified that this item 
constitutes a guarantee to the creditor that the Community will pay off the 
loans. 
24. To sum up, only the following would appear in the body of the budget: 
- the authorization in principle to borrow and to lend (line 1 
accompanied by a token entry), 
- the exact volume of repayments envisaged during the current year, 
corresponding to previous borrowing and lending authorizations. 
Entry in the annex to the budget (Capi~al budget) 
25. This entry has a dual purpose which cannot be achieved in.the budget 
itself, viz: 
- to show the ceiling figure on annual borrowing and lending authoriza-
tions. As already mentioned, this ceiling should not be set by basic 
regulations on the financial mechanisms but by annual dec'ision of the 
budgetary authority. This system would provide greater flexibility 
by allowing an annual review of the ceiling and give the budgetary 
authority full power to make the decision, ·as should be the case; 
- to ensure that the budgetary documents reflect the annual develop-
ment of the management of Community borrowing. 
26. There would thus be a genuine 'capital budget of the Communities' made 
up of 2 distinct parts: 
- 'capital operations' laying down the maximum amount for borrowings 
and lendings during the financial year under consideration for each 
of the existing financial mechanisms. This part would be divided into 
two sub-sections: revenue (for borrowings) and expenditure (for loans). 
The deliberations and the decision of the budgetary authority would 
be conf~ned to this part; 
- the 'debt management'' part, showing under both revenue and expenditure, 
the financial situation as regards the repayment of loans granted and 
raised - the situation regarding financial costs - the total annual 
balance of capital transactions - and finally the Community's net 
borrowing position. This part would only appear in the budget for 
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27. 
information since it would do no more than show the financial 
situation of the Community in the form.of a balance sheet of 
assets and liabilities. 
Summary 
There would be a two-step budgetary procedure for capital operations 
-consideration of the general budget for the purpose of providing the 
Commission with general authorization to borrow and lend and to 
authorize the annual repayments on previous borrowings and loans; 
-consideration of the 'capital budget' annex with a view to setting 
the maximum annual ceiling on borrowing and lending operations -
ta~ing account of information on debt management furnished by this 
annex. 
CO.Nt' LUS 1 O.NS 
28. These conclusions are the recommendations which the working party has 
drawn up for the Committee on Budgets in anticipation of the Parliament -
Council dialogue due to take place in the first quarter of 1976: 
(a) The Commission should be called upon to submit to Parliament 
the promised report on the balance sheet and the outlook for 
its loan policy1 • This report should explain what the 
Commission aims to do to coordinate the various borrowing 
procedures already in existence or under consideration; 
(b) the purpose of budgetizing Community loans is to bring them, in 
the form referred to in this document, within the normal process 
for authorizing Community revenue and expenditure; 
See Commission declarations 
- Mr Cheysson (sitting of E.P. of 19.6.1975) 1 ••• in the autumn of 
this year the Commission will present a report on all the communities' 
lendin~ ~nd bo:rowing transactions, and when I speak of the 
Communities I include all their sources of finance' 
Mr Cheysson (sitting of E.P. of 19.J.2.1975) : • ••• I felt that it was 
right that the E~P. should confirm its interest in this report. This 
confers greater importance on the presentation of this report and on 
the undertakin~ which I now give on behalf of the commission, and which 
I hope I can give on behalf of the EIB, to r,:iport on the coming months ••• , 
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(c) budgetization does not divest the Commission of any of its responsi-
bilities for managing loans: 
(d) budgetization should allow the budgetary authority-to set a maximum 
annual ceiling on capital transactions, based on complete information 
on the borrowing position of the Community: 
(e) the budgetary authority should set the annual ceiling by a procedure 
comparable to that for authorizing non-compulsory expenditure which 
leaves Parliament the last word: 
(f) the introduction of a Community 'capital budget' should make Community 
loan policy fully and clearly comprehensible: 
(g) the system described above should be introduced with the draft budget 
for the 1977 financial year: 
(h) ECSC financial transactions should also be budgetized, in a manner to 
be set out in detail later. 
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IV 
BUDGETIZATION OF FINANCIAL COOPERATION 
APPROPR-IATIONS AND THE EDF 
Draftsman: Miss FLESCH 
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I. The case for the budqetization of financial cooperation with third countries 
1. The budgetization of the EDF and financial cooperation with third 
countries in general is intrinsically a political choice. Should develop-
ment aid policy continue to be the 'sole preserve' of the Member States, or 
should it, while supplementing national measures, represent an independent 
policy fully integrated in Community policy as a whole? 
The Committee on Budgets believes that this question is relevant to the 
budget, but nevertheless it is obvious that financial cooperation must not be 
used~~-~ pretext for calling the global nature of the budget into question. 
-- -------. --
2. This question also has non-political aspects. 
Under the present EDF administration procedure resources come from 
payments made by the Member States on the basis of a scale of contributions, 
which means that the Fund falls outside the budget and therefore outside 
the competence of the European Parliament. This has raised problems 
in connection with principles that are basically established. 
3. From the legal point of view, development aid policy must be 
brought within the Community's sphere of competence if it is to become 
a true Community policy. 
Initially development aid indisputably fell within the Community's 
terms of reference. In fact, it is mentioned specifically in Article 
3(k) of the Treaty. The Association was originally limited to the 
overseas countries and territories. 
4. Now that many of the overseas countries and territories have gained 
their independence and the Association has been enlarged to include 
other developing countries, the legal framework of the Association has 
also been extended. It is no longer based solely on the provisions of 
the Treaty itself, but also on conventions between the community and 
the Associated States. 
Thus, the Association has remained within the Community's sphere 
of competence: its aim is still the' principle defined by Article 3(k) 
of the Treaty and it 'is the Community's responsibility by virtue of 
the powers conferred in particular by Article 238 of the Treaty. 
5. The principle that the Community should have its own resources 
covering all expenditure was clearly and definitively set out in the 
Treaty of 22 April 1970. 
Admittedly, as a result of circumstances, the council's Decision 
of 21 April 1970 did not expressly provide for the financing of the EDF 
from the Community's own resources. However it is not mentioned as an 
exception, like the supplementary programmes of Eu·ratom, and must therefore 
be considered to be subject in principle to the system of own resources. 
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6. The structure of the Association also calls for the integration of 
development aid policy in Conununity policy. The Association is entered 
into by the Conununity, i.e. the Member State·s and the Council on the one 
hand and the ACP countries on the other, the latter acting as a group 
during the negotiations. It is based on cooperation, and the powers and 
responsibilities are shared between the Conununity and the countries bene-
fiting from Community aid. 
Budgetization of the EDF and other forms of financial cooperation 
would give a more faithful reflection than the present system of the part 
played by the Conununity as such in the formation and management of the 
Association. 
Clearly, however, if this budgetization is not to hamper the develop-
ment of other Conununity policies it must ultimately be accompanied by an 
increase in the Comnunity's financial autonomy, which is, after all, some-
what restricted at present. 
7. In fact, quite apart from other disadvantages, the discussions at the 
end of the negotiations on the scale of contributions of the Member States 
paradoxically call into question the Conununity nature of these negotiations. 
The abolition of the discussions, which are neither historically nor 
economically justified, would considerably simplify a delicate stage in the 
negotiations, namely the decision on the amount of the appropriations for 
financial and technical cooperation. The use of own resources for the 
financing of this cooperation would mean that an activity of a Conununity 
nature could be carried out on the basis of Conununity financing. 
Moreover, the system of financing by means of contributions from the 
Member States is not consistent with the principles for the administration 
of the association as laid down by the convention. These specify that the 
responsibility for implementation is to be borne by the Conunission and do 
not provide for the participation of the Member States save in the context 
of Conununity institutions. 
Finally, budgetization of the EDF could ensure'continuity between two 
conventions and would eliminate the difficult problems of transitional 
periods, which are always prejudicial to the Associated States. 
8. From the financial point of view, a rapid assessment of the situation 
as regard the Convention of Lorne shows that budgetization of the EDF would 
not·raise any major problems. 
The 2,165 mu.a. set aside for subsidies and distributed over a period 
of five years could be met by the budget without the 1% '/AT limit being 
exceeded. 
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Moreover, the Community budget would be increasingly called on to 
finance capital expenditure and subsidies, transfers and laons granted 
by the EDF could easily be integrated in the policy for the budgetization 
of community loans. 
9. From the point of view of budgetary technique and principles, the 
advantages of budgetization of the EDF are clear. 
(a) True budgetary transparency can only be achieved if the budget 
represents a single unit, i.e. if all revenue, appropriations and 
expenditure are included in the same document. The extra-budgetary 
administration of the EDF undoubtedly represents a serious violation 
of this principle. 
(b) Budgetization of the EDF could make it possib1~ to group 
almost all development aid expenditure under a single sub-heading in 
the budget. This is a pre-requisite for the implementation of a coherent 
policy in this field. 
Nevertheless, two matters must at present remain outside the scope 
of the budgetization of the EDF: 
- Activities financed by the EIB 
- The financing of the cooperation agreements between the Community 
and the Maghreb and Mediterranean countries, the details of which 
have not yet been worked out. Budgetization should, however, be 
possi};)le. 
(c) Paradoxically, the system of financing the EDF by national 
contributions also splits the budgetary authority. Only the Council 
is involved in the decision on the authorization of expenditure, 1 whereas 
the budgetary authority as a whole - Council and Parliament - is responsible 
for control in respect of the discharge. This paradox must be eliminated. 
(d) Finally, budgetization of the EDF would redress the balance 
in the budget and would mean that the ·BAGGF appropriations would account 
for a more reasonable proportion of the budget. 
10. In view of the above, your draftsman is firmly· in favour of the. solution 
logiC'&lly following from the progress in the Commun'ity's developmenti. 
This solution makes it possible to integrate development aid policy 
in community policy as a whole and to lay the foundations for a generous 
Community external policy. 
1 In the EDF Committee, whose rules of procedure it adopts. 
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II. The problems raised by the budgetization of appropriations for financial 
cooperation 
Even when the political choice has been made, the budgetization of 
financial cooperation which must be a priority objective for Parliament will 
nevertheless raise certain problems. 
11. In the first place budgetization has not yet been achieved because 
of the Council's reservations. 
(a) Since the Council's Decision of 21 April 1970, replacing 
financial contributions from the Member States by own resources, the 
EDF has been an exception to the principles laid down by this decision 
even though it was not expressly mentioned as such; Parliament has con-
sistently called for its budgetization. 1 
(b) Following the position adopted by Parliament, the 
Commission of the European Communities submitted a communication to 
the council2 showing that budgetization of the EDF was both feasible 
and desirable. 
(c) With a view to the negotiations on the Convention of Lorn~, 
the Commission submitted a memorandum to the Council recommending the 
budgetization of the EDF. 3 In its resolution of 10 December 19744 , 
Parliament supported this point of view. 
(d) The Commission included in the preliminary draft budget for 
1975 an Article 900 on cooperation with the ACP countries. 
(e) The Council refused to incorporate the new article 
and reserved the right to draw up a supplementary budget if, at the 
end of the negotiations, it decided in favour of the budgetization of 
the EDF. In its report on the draft budget for 19755 , and in its resolution 
on the negotiations on the Convention of Lom~6 , Parliament once again 
called for the budgetization of the EDF and expressed displeasure at 
the council's dilatory attitude. 
7 (f) Despite this, the internal agreement of 11 July 1975 set 
up the 4th EDF on the basis of contributions from the Member States. 
·1 
committee on Relations with the African States and Malagasy - meeting 
of 21.6.1971. Sec also resolutions on the discharge in respect 
of the EDJi' 
2 SEC(73) 2149 final. 
3 Bulletin of 
4 Doc. 388/74. 
5 Doc. 350/74. 
the European Communities - Supplement 1/73. 
6 Resolution of 10.12.1974. Rapporteur: Miss Flesch, on behalf 
of the committee on Development and cooperation and Opinion by Mr Aigner 
on behalf of the Committee on Budgets. 
7 Doc. 212/75, second part. 
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(g) In its resolution of 16 October 1975 on the Convention of 
Lom~; Parliament deplored this situation. However, it welcomed the 
'Member States' agreement in principle to budgetization within the frame-
work of the renewal of the Convention• 2 • 
(h) It seems, therefore, that the Council's reservations have to 
some extent been dispelled. In principle it is in favour of the budget-
ization of the EDF, but thinks it preferable to wait for the renewal 
of the convention before embodying this principle in the texts. 
It would therefore be desirable to obtain a more formal undertaking 
from the council. 
12. The implied aim of the budgetization of the EDF is to give the 
budgetary authority the power to determine the amount of annual instalments. 
13. To ensure that the overall amount of the appropriations is not 
called into question by Parliament which, unlike the Council, cannot 
participate directly in the negotiations and is therefore not formally 
bound by their outcome, it would be desirable for Parliament to be able 
to express its point of view during the negotiations, perhaps in the context 
of a cooperation procedure, and also for it to give its opinion on 
the outcome of these negotiations. Traditionally, this general constitu-
tional principle takes the form of ratification by Parliament of inter-
national acts having budgetary implications. Thus, when the budget is 
adopted, the debate on annual instalments could more easily be kept within 
the framework of the appropriations as a whole. 
14. The problem of how the EDF should be incorporated in the budget 
is complex and several solutions are possible. Your draftsman has 
based his proposal on the following considerations: 
(a) Although, in the event of budgetization, EDF revenue will be 
drawn entirely from the Community's own resources, expenditure will 
be effected in the framework of the Association which, by virtue of its 
duration, its composition and its international character, is separate 
from the Community. 
1 Doc. 283/75. 
2 At the meeting .during which it decided on the financing of the 4th 
EDF by contributioas from the Member States, the council announced 
its intention of budgetizing the 5th EDF. 
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(b) On the other hand, development aid expenditure, which mainly 
takes the form of expenditure on investment, is also to a large extent 
capital expenditure. 
(c) For these reasons it would be desirable for EDF appropriations 
to be given a special place in the Commission Section of the bu:lget. 
It is therefore suggested that the draftsman responsible for matters 
of nomenclature should take account of the sharing of responsibilities 
between the Community and the ACP countries as regards the definition 
of the policy and the broad lines of financial and technical cooperation1 
he should also take account of the large proportion·of the· EDF's expend-
iture accounted for by the capital expenditure (30% not counting EIB 
interventions). 
15. The problem of supervision of the management of the EDF should not 
be treated separately from that of the EDF's place in the budget. The 
distribution of responsibility for overseeing how expenditure is 
effected should reflect the sharing of decision powers on the expenditure 
itself. Those responsibilities are shared between the Community and 
the ACP countries. 
To extend the distribution of responsibilities., the Association• s 
Consultative Assembly might be required to deliver an opinion on the 
discharge given by the Budgetary Authority on the management of the Fund. 
16. Furthermore, it is obvious that budgetization of financial cooperation 
with third countries would automatically entail reinforcing the retrospective 
control over this expenditure and bringing it into line with the control 
over other parts of the budget. 
This would mean abolishing the present unsatisfactory system of 
internal control on a Community basis and introducing normal external 
control by the proposed Court of Auditors and the budgetary authority. 
17. The only major difference between the problems involved in the budg'et-
ization of other forms of financial cooperation with third countries 
and the EDF's position lies in the scale of this cooperation and the number 
of countries associated. However, the agreements establishing such co-
operation will be concluded or renewed in a relatively short time and in 
any case before the Convention of Lome expires. 
1 See Articles 41(2) and 43 of the Convention of Lome. 
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18. The conclusions or renewal of these association or cooperation agree-
ments with Malta, the Maghreb countries and other Arab countries (Jordan, 
Syria, Egypt, etc.) and with Portugal, could provide an indication of the 
position of the Commission and Council on this matter. 
As there is some danger that Parliament will be presented with a 
fait accompli, it would perhaps be advisable for Parliament to notify the 
Commission and the Council of its views immediately and in particular, 
to ask the Commission to define its position clearly. 
111. Stages of budgetization of financial cooperation with third countries 
19. Your draftsman considers that the budgetization of financial cooperation 
with third countries, associated or otherwise, is a priority objective 
that must be put into effect immediately. However, it must be admitted 
that in the present circumstances, since the Lome Convention will enter 
into force on 1 April 1976 and a number of steps have already been taken 
towards its implementation, budgetization will present certain difficulties. 
Nevertheless, it is perfectly feasible to include the association agreements 
with the Mediterranean countries and the cooperation agreement with Portugal 
in the budget as soon as they are concluded or renewed. 
Parliament will have to be consulted on all such agreements having 
financial implications. 
In the case of the Convention of Lome, your draftsman considers 
gradual budgetization, to be completed before the expiry of the present 
convention, to be both desirable and practicable. 
20. The internal agreements of 11 July 1975 confer upon the budgetary 
authority (and, after the entry into force of the Treaty amending the 
budgetary provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities, 
on Parliament alone) the power of giving discharge in respect of the 
financial management of the EDF. 1 
21. _This provision should be seen as a measure preparatory to t~e exercise 
by Parliament of its budgeLary powers over the EDF. 
This is so because power to grant discharge in respect of expenditure 
effected logically implies lhe power to authorize this expenditure, and 
these two aspects of the same budgetary power can only be separated 
provisionally and for reasons of expediency. 
1 
Article 31 of the internal agreement. 
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22. In view of this, the Financial Regulation for the 4th EDF to be 
adopted by the Council when the Convention enters into force should 
enable Parliament to obtain all the information on the management of the 
EDF and to deliver its opinion on all aspects of that management. 
It is essential, therefore, that Parliament should play a part in 
the drafting of the Financial Regulation for the 4th EDF 1 • 
23. Thus, under the te".1lls of this Financial Regulation, Parliament should 
be entitled to receive: 
{1 1 The information now supplied to the Member States or to the 
Council of Ministers on the use of the funds {Article 29 of 
the internal agreement) and on the management of Community aid 
(Article 41(2) of the Convention); 
(2) The estimates of the commitments and payments {Article 7 of 
the internal agreement); 
(3) Information on the objectives pursued by the ACP countries 
{Article 16 of the internal agreement); 
and possibly deliver an opinion on those documents relating to the admini-
stration and control of the EDF. 
24. After a transitional period, and before the date on which the present 
Convention expires, mechanisms should be introduced to enable the budgetary 
authority to exercise its powers in this area to the full. 
IV. To sum up, discussions with the Council and the commission should 
be aimed at establishing a joint position for the three Institutions on: 
- the principle and timing of the implementation of the budgetization of 
the financial cooperation; 
- the form of Parliament's approval of the progress and outcome of 
negotiations on the conclusion or renewal of agreements; 
- the method of incorporating appropriations for financial cooperation 
in the budget (revenue and expenditure). 
- the need to confer upon Parliament, in the administration of financial 
cooperation with thi d countries, the power to grant a discharge similar 
to the power it has in regard to the management of the various sections 
of the Community budget; 
1 
Parliament's right of co-decision in respect of the EDF Financial 
Regulation; 
It should be recalled that Article 30 of the internal agreement of 
11.7.1975 makes no provision for Parliament's participation in 
the drafting procedure. Such participation must therefore be obtained by 
means of a gentlemen's agreement between the three Institutions. 
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initially, the notification for debating purposes of documents concerning 
the management of the EDF; 
- subsequently, but before the expiry of the present Convention, the 
establishment of the budgetary powers to be conferred upon the Council 
and Parliament as the budgetary authority. 
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INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF THE 4th EDF 
(Internal agreement of 11 July 1975 on the financing and 
administration of Community aid). 
Article 1 
L (omitted) 
2. The Fund shall consist of 3,150 million units of account to be 
financed by the Member States as follows: 
Belgium 196.875 million units of account 
Denmark 75. 600 million units of account 
Germany 817.425 million units of account 
France 817.425 million units of account 
Ireland 18.900 million units of account 
Italy 378.000 million units of account 
Luxembourg 6.300 million units of account 
Netherlands 250.425 million units of account 
United Kingdom 589.050 million units of account 
3. The amount stated in paragraph 2 shall be allocated as follows: 
(a) 3,000 million units of account for the ACP States, comprising: 
2,100 million units of account in the form of grants 
430 million units of account in the form of special loans 
95 million units of account in the form of risk capital 
375 million units of account in the form of transfers pursuant 
to Title II of the Convention; 
(b) 130 million units of account for the Countries and Territories 
and the French Overseas Departments, comprising: 
65 million units of account in the form of grants; 
40 million units of account in the form of special loans; 
5 million units of account in the form of risk capital; 
20 million units of account as a reserve; 
- 34 - PE 44.071/fin, 
(c) 20 million units of account in the form of transfers for the 
Countries and Territories, pursuant to those provisions of the 
Decision which concern the system for stabilizing export earnings. 
4. (omitted) 
5. (omitted) 
Article 2 
To the amount laid down in Article 1(2) shall be added up to 
400 million units of account in the form of loans granted by the Bank from 
its own resources under the conditions laid down by it in accordance with 
its Statute. 
These loans shall be allocated as follows: 
(a) up to the amount of 390 million units of account, for financing 
operations to be carried out in the ACP States; 
(b) up to the amount of 10 million units of account, for financing 
operations to be carried out in the Countries and Territories and 
the French overseas Departments. 
Articles 3 and following: (omitted). 
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V 
COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS 
Draftsman Mr Michael SHAW 
_ 36 _ PE 44. 07]/fin. 
1 
Introduction 
1. To set in perspective the consideration of the issue of the extension of 
the use of the commitment appropriations, the existing provisions in the 
Financial Regulation1 that pertain to the idea of commitment appropriations 
are cited at Annex I to this document. 
Furthermore, the great volume of carry forwards between financial years 
may be attributable in large part to the unwieldy nature of the existing 
commitment appropriations/payment appropriations position: Annex II shows 
particulars of carry forwards into each of the past two financial years. 
Disadvantages of some aspects of the present position 
2. The wide spread of provisions relating to commitment appropriations takes 
from the clarity and transparency of budgetary procedures. The differences 
between the arrangements for commitments in the four areas - Social Fund, 
Regional Fund, EAGGF and research and investment - make comprehension of the 
Financial Regulation overall less easy and renders the work of Parliament in 
exercising political choices more difficult. Parliament has stressed, on 
many occasions, the need to avoid unnecessary complexities in Community 
1:!exts. 
3. There arises out of the present arrangements regarding appropriations a 
situation which can be summarized as follows. Appropriations are entered in 
the budget for specific actions which cannot be completed and paid - or even 
committed - in the course of the budgetary year. Where a commitment is validly 
entered into but not paid, automatic carry forward is allowed. However, where 
no commitment has been entered into, the possibility of non-automatic carry 
forward exists2 • The amounts involved in these carry forwards are considerable: 
Parliament's role in regard to them is minimal and the final decision is made 
late in the financial year3 • The clarity of the budget as an instrument of 
financial policy is reduced, because the budget as adopted contains elements 
which do not have to be met during the financial year: as well, expenditure 
possibilities brought forward from earlier years by way of the non-automatic 
carry forwards arrangement, which can be added at a late stage, are many times 
the amount which Parliament can add to the budget: moreover, effecting demo-
cratic Parliamentary control is most limited, in this area. 
OJ No. L 116, 1.5.1973. 
2 Article 6 of the Financial Regulation. 
3 As late as Autmnn, in 1974. 
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Existing arrangements have not worked smoothly 
4. While there exists in the Financial Regulation the possibility of operating 
commitment authorizations in certain fields, this facility has not led to the 
smooth functioning of multi-annual programmes in the social or research and 
investment areas. Moreover, the specific entries in the Financial Regulation 
relating to commitment appropriations appear to have acted as a brake on the 
extension of the arrangement to other articles in the budget. 
5. The apparent tardiness of the Council to reach decisions in the past has 
also compromised the possibility of the full role of the commitment appropria-
tions, as an instrument of budgetary policy, being operated. For instance, 
within the research and investment progranne, the attitude of the Council has 
been, in a general way, to delay to the maximum (taking account, of course, 
of the critical situation of Community research and, therefore, for political 
reasons) the entering of the annual tranches of payment appropriations. It 
could be held, too, in regard to the Social Fund, that the commitment authoriza-
tion procedure, permitting the possibility of articulating the Fund, has been 
more a matter of form than of substance. 
6. This is not a criticism of the commitment appropriation concept: rather, 
it is a statement of the fact that, over past years, the budget was not pre-
pared in a genuinely longer-term perspective. Time and again, the annual 
budget has been criticised because of its seeming ad hoe nature and because 
decisions which should have been taken at the outset were left over for inclu-
sion in a later supplementary budget. More attention should have been paid to 
the likely level of future year activity, so as to make the budget a comprenen-
sive statement of Community financial activity. 
Reservations about extension of the commitment appropriations concept 
7. In the past, reservations have been expressed about the generalization of 
the commitment appropriations concept. This could be attributed, in part at 
least, (i) to a desire not to. have funds blocked by being assigned theoretica11yl; 
(ii) to the fact that commitment appropriations operate in the budgets of only 
certain Member States2 , (iii) to the delicate problems of a political nature 
that could arise when fixing figures for a particular financial year and (iv) to 
the implementation problems which could arise unless items were correctly inter-
preted and the methods of operation were carefully set out3 • · 
1 The entering of commitment appropriations should not lead to an interminable 
delay in the completion of projects. 
2 This technique is used notably in Germany and Francet in the U.K., for instance, 
the principle of annuality is strictly adhered to. 
3 The commitment appropriations concept, if liberally used without strict adher-
ence to prompt implementation, could take from annuality and transparency and 
might operate to separate widely the budget decision from the expenditure action. 
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Treaty aspects 
8. A possible doubt about the appropriateness of the institutionalization of 
the commitments appropriations concept might arise from the provision of the 
EEC Treaty at Article 199 which states that 
'All items of revenue and expenditure of the Community, 
including those relating to the European Social Fund, 
shall be included in estimates to be drawn up for each 
financial year and shall be shown in the budget. 
The revenue and expenditure shown in the budget shall be 
in balance.' 
It could be feared that the unlimited recourse to the concept of commitment 
appropriations would be of a nature that would modify the very essence of the 
Community budget as an annual estimate: in other words, that it ~ight take 
from the principle of annuality. However, a powerful counter-argument is pro-
vided by the following comments on the use of the triennial forecast, the multi-
year budget aspect and the practice followed generally in Member States. More-
over, putting the annual budget in the longer-term context adds to clarity, 
gives added meaning to the budget for the year ahead and is in accord with the 
broad approach adopted by most National Parliaments - which is to adopt the 
budget having regard to the longer-term implications of on-going policies. 
Triennial forecasts 
9. The Commission attached to the preliminary draft budget 1976 a set of 
financial forecasts for the year 1976 - 1978. This exercise responded to the 
Council's decision of 21 April 1970 which asked that the annual budget be set 
within the framework of multi-annual forecasts. These forecasts, when further 
elaborated, will present the budgetary authority with considerably strengthened 
data for forming an overall view of the medium-term implications of the budget 
under consideration. It.is to be expected that, in the coming years, these 
forecasts will help to set budgetary policies in a fuller perspective. Institu-
tionalized commitment appropriations could serve as a hinge between the annual 
1 budget and the longer-term budget 
Multi-year aspect 
10. Improved coherence could be given to the consideration of the full implica-
tions of budgetary decisions by viewing the financial impact of policies either 
about to be initiated or already under way in the context of a progranme 01 
several years. To enable all those concerned - budgetary authority, Commission, 
Member States and beneficiaries - to plan ahead in an orderly fashion, outlines 
of the probable level of commitments spreading over a few years would appear 
to be desirable. The principle already applies in certain areas of the budget 
of the Communities; and, moreover, national authorities, international 
1 As well, a multi-annual approach would give an image of greater continuity 
to the general budget of the Communities while facilitating planning in the 
sectors most affected throughout the Communities. ~ 39 - PE 44.071/fin. 
organizations and private concerns, when settling their expenditure for the 
1 year ahead, look at the longer-term aspect as well. 
Impact on carry forwards 
11. As can be seen from Annex II, carry forwards in the past two financial years 
were equivalent to about 38 per cent and 29 per cent of the annual budget as 
2 
adopted. On two occasions last year, Parliament adopted resolutions uealing 
with carry forwards. In these resolutions, attention was drawn to the danger 
which this procedure could pose for Parliament's role in the budgetary sphere;it 
was p:rlntedout that the possibility of ready access to the carry forward facility 
may contribute to less attention being paid to the need to implement Community 
schemes promptly and suggested that the Co~unity' s system of expenditure 
control should be reappraised. In the resolution adopted on 20 June 1975 
(Doc. 143/75), Parliament indicated that the possibility of developing a system 
of forward monitoring of expenditure should be examined with a view to ensuring 
that the likelihood of substantial shifts, in the making of payments, as between 
financial years, be detected as early as possible and be communicated to 
Parliament before the completion of the procedure for adopting the budget for 
the following year. This aspect is most relevant to the present effort to find 
a suitable solution to the commitment/payment problem. Parliament is par-
ticularly conscious of the need to have a system which would reduce, as far as 
possible, the incidence of carry forwards of a non-automatic nature. 
Revision of the Financial Regulation provisions 
12. It is considered that a single article in the Financial Regulation 
should contain the procedure relating to commitment appropriations. This 
should be to the effect that the budgetary authority may, where proposals re-
lating to projects extending over several years are concerned, qecide to 
show both commitment and payment appropriations in the budget, acting on the 
advice of the Commission. 
13. Sub-paragraphs of the new article would set out any particular arrangements 
relating to the EAGGF guidance and the research and investment appropriations. 
Tcansitional arrangements would require to be worked out in regard to the 
four present systems. 
14. Following is an outline of the budgetary presentation format that would 
appear to be most useful. 
On left-hand page: commitment for year; payment appropriations for year 
with comparative figures for preceding year. 
On right-hand page: (i) estimates of the commitments for the coming 
three to five years and (ii) estimates of the 
likely level of payments for the coming years. 
1 In this way, a fuller view can be had of the financing involved 
as well as calling for an effort to quantify the economic and social impact 
of the measures. 
2 7.6% and 10.4% respectively being non-automatic carry forwards. 
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Say, in budget of 1977, for a project likely to extend over four years: 
Conunitment 
1977 40 
Payment appro- l 
priations 
20 
1978 
1979 
.1980 
1981 
Conunitment appro-
priations 
60 
40 
10 
(all amounts in mu.a.) 
Payment appro-
priations 
50 
30 
20 
30 
15. This presentation in the budget document as adopted, together with an 
amplified explanation in the financial statement, would add to clarity and 
would be in harmony with the wishes of Parliament as expressed in Amendments 
Nos. 53, 68 and 59 to the 1976 draft budget. However, figures for the years 
1978 to 1981 would be indicative in nature and in no way binding. The figures 
would be open for decision in the course of the settling of the budget, each 
year, at which time up-to-date information on the sphere of activity in question, 
as well as on developments in the current year, would be taken into account. 
16. It is, of course, highly probable that the actual pattern of conunitments 
and payments would not follow that envisaged in the first year of the progranune. 
To illustrate, the total shown in the example at paragraph 14 could be taken. 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Conunitments 
30 (40) 
70 (60) 
0 (40) 
so ( 10) 
(-) (-) 
in m u.a.; 
Payments 
25 (20) 
45 ( 50) 
40 (30) 
30 (20) 
10 (30) 
Cumulative 
balance of 
conunitments 
availablel 
150 (150) 
120 (110) 
50 (SO) 
50 (10) 
(-) (-) 
Cumulative 
amount of 
payments 
25 (20) 
70 (70) 
110 (100) 
140 · ( 120) 
150 (150) 
figures in brackets show the first 
year indicative estimates 
1 at outset of financial year 
17. Many other variations are possible. The essential element, however, is 
that the amount of the conunitments and payments appropriations would be fixed, 
during the course of the adoption of the budget, in accordance with normal 
financial criteria and in the light of the most up-to-date information. 
This would clearly make for greater transparency; it would result in the 
budget being a far more accurate reflection of estimated developments. More-
over, it would add to the democratic control of Parliament over the budget by 
removing the massive emergence of non-automatic carry forwards over which 
Parliamentary control is negligible. 
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In order that non-automatic carry forwards should be minimized. it is desir-
able that a rectifying letter be submitted by the Commission before 1 November, 
in the light of up-to-date information from Member States. This would permit 
of late stage adjustments to certain lines in the budget. Parliament would 
thus be informed in adequate time and recourse to non-automatic carry forwards 
would be reduced. 
Basis of estimation of figures 
18. Important elements in the determining of the entries - commitment and pay-
ment - in the budget are the accuracy of the basis of calculation and the tech-
nique used to analyse activities and to determine the appropriate sum to be 
included in the budget. Clearly, certain areas of the budget do not lend 
themselves to precise estimation~ however, some activities likely to be suit-
able for coverage in the commitment appropriation procedure could be assessed 
and quantified reasonably closely. The system of analysis should be flexible 
and should contribute positively to the rational allocation of resources, as 
well as permitting of speedy forward review of future prospects. The fate of 
the PPBS technique is, therefore, somewhat perturbing - because the team engaged 
in its consideration has been disbanded by the Commission~ 
19. A multi-annual type of operation, such as that envisaged, would require the 
operation of a carefully articulated accounting system involving rapid review 
of outturn and "forward looks". In this way, budget entries could be calculated 
with greater accuracy. 
Summary 
20. The budget as a policy instrument is enhanced when set in a medium-term 
or longer-term context. 
Parliamentary control of major policies can be improved within such a 
broader framework. 
To relate budgetary policy to the longer-term or to the medium-term, the 
extended use of multi-annual budget techniques as apply in certain Member 
States is highly desirable. 
The preparation of multi-annual projects, even in selected areas only 
and not across the budgetary board, involves the determining of commitments so 
that Parliament, the Executive, and the public can usefully plan ahead, over 
a span of years, in the knowledge that a certain expenditure programme will be 
. broadly foll~\:,'.ed. 
·-· - --r-·------------------
1 See the reply of the Commission to Miss FLESCH's questionnaire PE 37.~83 
on the Report of the Audit Board on the accounts for the financial year 
1972. 
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It would appear, in all the circumstances, that the commitment arrangements 
within the Financial Regulation, and which relate to four areas, lack the 
flexibility which would appear to be desirable. 
The European Parliament has constantly urged that procedures should be 
transparent - that they should be as readily understood by the public as by 
technical and accounting experts: these desiderata should apply as far as 
possible to commitment appropriations. 
1 Wider recourse to commitment arrangements would create a need for 
- effective techniques for the computing of future year activities so that 
commitment entries in the budget should be as close as possible to actual 
requirements: 
- close review of the actual outturn with a watch on the quarterly returns 
so that the pattern of utilization - which would be indicative of the 
accuracy of estimates - would be deduced as early as possible: 
- a clear presentation of the commitment appropriation details in the 
financial statement; 
- closer link-up with the multi-year forecasts. 
This change would best be effected by a re-drafting of the Financial 
Regulation in regard to commitment appropriations so that a single unified 
provision would apply to this concept; phasing in arrangements would be 
required for the existing·provisions and for specific adjustments to be made 
at a late stage in the budgetary procedure to take account of changes which the 
Commission might.wish to make to the commitment entries as a result of analysis 
of details of commitment and payment patterns during the closing months of the 
financial year in train. 
Annuality aspect 
2 21. In the report on the draft general budget for 1976 (Doc. 306/75), 
Mr COINTAT made the following remarks on the annuality aspect: 
'The principle of an annual budget means that expenditure 
is authorized for only a limited period of one year. 
Obviously, in some cases, the principle has to be adjusted 
to meet the requirements of the modern management of public 
finances (financing of plans or programmes spread over 
several years). But it must not be forgotten that the pur-
pose of the annual budget principle is to enable the budge-
1 The Commission's Explanatory Memorandum on the distinction between 
commitment appropriations and payment appropriations is reproduced at 
Annex III, for ready reference. 
2 Doc. 361/75, p. 17. 
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tary authority to control public revenue and expenditure 
at regular and short intervals; the budgetary authority 
cannot agree to relinquish control of one category of 
expenditure for several years on the pretext that it is 
financing a multi-annual project. The European Parlia-
ment must therefore give careful consideration to any 
amendment that might call into question the 1 principle 
of an annual budget.' 
As i.s i.ndil',1lnd in t·lw r,>rnqolnq p,HiHJr.iphs, especially in paragraph 8 
above, the wider use of commitment appropriations would not in any way take 
from the essence of the Community budget as an annual estimate. Indeed, 
setting the annual budget in the longer-term context insofar as certain 
projects were concerned would add to clarity and would ensure that the budget 
for the year ahead was adopted in the light of fuller information on the 
overall implications of the measures envisaged. 
Finally, it must be clearly recognized that, in regard to commitment 
appropriations, the role of Parliament must be at least as comprehensive as 
it is at present in regard to non-compulsory expenditure. The wider use of 
this technique will not take from the annuality of the budget; neither must 
it in any way erode the budgetary power of Parliament. 
Cone lusions 
22. Annuality would be safeguarded and, indeed, enhanced by recourse to 
wider use of commitment appropriations. The technique would apply to projects 
extending over several. years and not, of course, to all items in the budget. 
Annual revision would be a key element in the operation of the system 
and this, in turn, would require sound expenditure review and analysis 
techniques. 
The institutionalization of commitment appropriations should be linked, 
ideally, to the minimizing of recourse to non-automatic carry forwards. 
Provisions in the Financial Regulation relating to commitment appro-
priations should be consolidated in a single article and made uniforIL. 
Summary particulars of commitment appropriations should be q.r.ouped, 
for ready reference. 
The extension of the use of commitment credits should follow from a 
clear 'common declaration' by the three Institutions regarding the exact 
nature, scope and objectives of the change. Furthermore, there should be 
an undertaking to revise Article 6 of the Financial Regulation to provide 
that1 for non-automatic carry forwards to be authorized, the prior common 
accord of the Council and Parliament ~uld be required. As well, the 
position regarding EAGGF appropriations - carry forwards of which at 
present are automatic for a period of up to five years 1- should be brought 
into line with the proposed procedure for non-automatic carry forwards 
generally. 
1 See Article 6(5) of the Financjal Regulation. 
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ANNEX I 
Provisions relating to commitment appropriations 
in the Financial Regulation 
Provisions applicable to research and 
' t t . t' l inves men appropria ions 
Article 95 
3. Commitment appropriations within each envelope shall 
be designed to cover all the legal obligations which the 
Commission may contract. 
They shall represent the upper limit of expenditure to 
which the Commission may commit itself during the finan-
cial year in question for the attainment of the objec-
tives to which this expenditure relates. 
Commission appropriations shall remain valid until they 
are cancelled under the budgetary procedure. 
Provisions applicable to the 
European Social Fund1 
Article 104 
1. In accordance with the Council Decision of 
1 February 1971 and without prejudice to Article 10 (2) 
of that Decision, the budget for a given financial year 
shall include under the title 'European Social Fund': 
(a) appropriations for that financial yearr 
(b) authorization of commLtments for the two following 
financial years. 
2. Subject to Article 6, appropriations for a given 
financial year shall cover payments which fall to be 
made during that year in respect either of commitments 
entered into during that same financial year or to 
commitments entered into during preceding financial 
years in pursuance of such authorizations as are re-
ferred to in paragraph 1 (b). 
l OJ No. L 116, 1.5.1973, pps. 22, 25. 
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3. Authorizations of commitments shall fix for the 
two following financial years the amounts up to which 
commitments may be entered into during the financial 
year concerned, nnder Articles 4 and 5 of the Council 
Decision of 1 February 1971. They shall be grouped 
according to budget year and broken down according to 
the budgetary nomenclaure. 
Provisions applicable to the EAGGF -
Guidance Section1 
1 
Article 114 
1. Appropriations provided for in Article 6 (5) of 
Regulation (EEC) No. 729/70 shall be entered as such 
in the budget for the financial years in question 
and shall be included in the appropriations to be 
covered in accordance with the financial measures 
applicable to that financial year. 
2. Appropriations to be re-entered from preceding 
financial years shall be entered as such in the budget 
for the financial year in which it is provided that 
they shall be committed. They shall be covered by 
revenue in accordance with the financial provisions 
applicable to the financial year for which they are 
committed subject to the special provisions of 
Article 3 (5) of the Decision of 21 April 1970, which 
article governs the appropriations for the Guidance 
Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, of which the first entry relates to 
a budget before that of the 1972 financial year. 
3. Appropriations to be re-entered from preceding 
financial years, the commitment of which has not been 
provided for in the financial year in question, shall 
be included in a special entry in the budget comments. 
They shall not require to be cover~d by the revenue of 
that financial year. However, they shall constitute 
commitment authorization in so far as they are the 
subject of commitment decisions pursuant to the 
measures taken within the framework of the common 
agricultural policy. In that case, the relevant amend-
ments in respect of revenue shall be carried out through 
the budgetary procedure. 
OJ No. L 116, 1.5.1973, p.26. 
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' ,I 
1 
Provisions applicable to the European 
Regional Development Fund1 
Article 115b 
1. The budget of the European Communities for a 
financial year shall show under the Title for the 
Fund for the financial year concerned: 
(a) commitment appropriations; and 
(b) payment appropriations. 
2. Commitment appropriations shall represent the 
upper limit of expenditure to which the Commission 
may commit itself for the implementation of the 
corresponding operations. 
Commitment appropriations which are not used by 
the end of the financial year for which they are 
shown in the budget shall remain available during 
the following two financial years. 
3. Commitment appropriations shall represent the 
upper limit of expenditure which may be authorized 
or paid during each financial year to cover commit-
ments entered into during the same financial year 
or preceding years. 
OJ No. L 73, 21.3.1975, p.46. 
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ANNEX II 
8IDQY!}t§_inY2!y~g_!n_D2n=sYt2metis_ss~IY-I2!;WsI2i 
iD-l2Z4-aD1Ll22~ 
(1) Non-automatic carry forwards 1973 to 1974(a) 
(2) Non-automatic carry forwards 1974 to 1975(b) 
(3) Budget 1974 as adopted(c) 
(4) Budget 1975 as adopted(d) 
(5) 1973 to 1974 non-automatic carry forwards 
as percentage of the 1974 budget= .ill.. 
(3) 
(6) 1974 to 1975 non-automatic carry forwards 
as percentage of the 1975 budget= J1l 
(4) 
(7) 1973 to 1974 automatic carry forwards: 
(8) 1974 to 1975 automatic carry forwards: 
(9) (7) as percentage of (3): 
(10) (8) as percentage of (4): 
(a) Doc. 110/75 
(b) Doc. 100/75 
(c) OJ Vol. 17, No. L 115, 29.4.1974, p. 
(d) OJ Vol. 18, No. L 54, 28.2.1975, p. 
_48 
45 
49 
388.3 mu.a. 
601.3 m u.a. 
5,079.5 mu.a. 
5,825.3 mu.a. 
7.6% 
10.4% 
1,562.2 mu.a. 
1,081.2 mu.a. 
30.7% 
18.5% 
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ANNEX III 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM! 
RELATING TO THE 
PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION 
AMENDING THE FINANCIAL REGULATION OF 25 APRIL 1973 
APPLICABLE TO THE GENERAL BUDGET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
(COM(75) 425 final, TRANSMITTED TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND THE COUNCIL ON 11 AUGUST 1975) 
(OJ No. 199, 30 AUGUST 1975, PAGES 3 AND 4) 
(Distinction between "appropriations for commitment" 
and "appropriations for payment") 
1 working Document of the Departments of the Commission 
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XIX-A-4 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
RELATING TO THE 
Brussels, 19 January 1976 
PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION 
AMENDING THE FINANCIAL REGULATION OF 25 APRIL 1973 
APPLICABLE TO THE GENERAL BUDGET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
(COM(75) 425 final, TRANSMITTED TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND THE COUNCIL ON 11 AUGUST 1975) 
(OJ No. 199, 30 AUGUST 1975, PAGES 3 AND 4) 
(Distinction between "appropriations for conunitment" 
and "appropriations for payment") 
In the memorandum on the distinction between appropriations for payment and 
appropriations for commitment which might be applied in the general budget of 
the communities1 , the Commission had made a detailed study of the problems 
involved in the application of such a distinction within the framework of the 
general budget. The Conunission had concluded that such a distinction would 
have both advantages and disadvantages. 
Since then, the entry into force of the Financial Regulation of 25 April 1973, 
its application for more than two years and the development of common policies 
have enabled a better assessment to be made of the system currently applied 
and new problems to be discovered. 
Following its reexamination, the Commission decided that a distinction between 
appropriations for commitment and appropriations for payment could also be made 
in other fields, as has meanwhile occurred in the case of the European Regional 
Development Fund. The memorandum mentioned above reveals that it is pointless 
to apply this distinction to expenditure incurred during the financial year 
for which the appropriations are allocated. However, in the case of expenditure 
on projects which must necessarily be spread over several years, the application 
of such a distinction means that there is no need to freeze the appropriations 
which are required for commitment to the projects concerned,'but demonstrably 
can be spent only during later financial years. 
l SEC(72) 842 final, 1.3.1972 
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Carry-overs of appropriations from one financial year to the next, which have 
received sharp criticism from the Budgetary Authority both during Council 
meetings and during debates in the Parliament, will become exceptional cases. 
Budgetary transparency, which all the Institutions are seeking to improve, 
will thus be increased. At the same time the management of the budget will 
be simplified. 
Neither the operating expenses nor the expenditure from the Guarantee Section 
of the EAGGF would seem to require the application of a distinction between 
appropriations for commitment and appropriations for payment, as such expendi-
ture is effected during the financial year for which the appropriations are 
granted. 
However, certain fields (e.g. industry and energy) involve projects requiring 
a longer-term commitment. The proposed distinction would clearly be useful 
for the appropriations for financing such projects. Furthermore, experience 
has shown that in the case of expenditure from the Social Fund, the distinction 
between authorizations for commitment and appropriations for payment is not 
sufficient to solve the problems posed by the often very long time lags between 
the commitment of the appropriation and the actual payment. A complete 
separation of appropriations for commitment and appropriations for payment in 
this field could provide an effective remedy which would be particularly 
advantageous in that it would prevent excessive carry-overs. 
In order to take these points into account, the Commission proposes to adopt 
a simple solution which will enable the Budgetary Authority to define, case 
by case, each field in which it might prove beneficial to distinguish between 
appropriations for commitment and appropriations for payment. 
The definitions of appropriations for commitment and appropriations for pay-
ment must be as clear as possible. The Commission proposes the following 
definitions: 
- Appropriations for commitment 
Appropriations entered in the budget in order to enable the Commission to 
contract the necessary legal obligations to cover the total cost of specific 
projects to be implemented over several financial years. They constitute 
the upper limit of expenditure which the commission is authorized to enter 
into commitments in order to effect the operations involved in the projects 
concerned. 
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- Appropriations for payment 
Appropriations entered in the budget to allow of the authorization and 
payment - before the end of the financial year - of the expenditure corres-
ponding to the state of completion of the commitments entered into during 
the current or preceding financial years. 
In theory, the distinction between appropriations for commitment and appro-
priations for payment could be applied to all multiannual projects. However, 
the Budgetary Authority must take a separate decision on each project within 
the framework of the budgetary procedure. The advantage of this method is 
that it is as balanced as possible at institutional level: the Commission 
proposes that a distinction be made between appropriations for commitment 
and appropriations for payment: the Budgetary Authority (Council and Parlia-
ment) takes a decision, after discussing the matter, when the annual budget 
is adopted. Every year the requisite changes can thus be made without the 
need for a special procedure. This institutional aspect is of prime import-
ance since, as these are budgetary problems, it would be abnormal for the 
decision to be taken by one single institution without being included in 
the budgetary decision-making procedure. 
It goes without saying that those fields in which it has already been decided 
that a distinction must be made between appropriations for commitment and 
appropriations for payment (appropriations for research and investment, 
appropriations for the European Regional Development Fund) are not affected 
by the text proposed by the Commission. 
ln tho <.:onu11iHHion':; opj11io11, Lhc allll.'IHhnL'lll ol the J·'inancial Regulation, which 
is the object of the text annexed hereto, thus satisfies the requirements of 
doubt as to the validity of the structures which have been established and 
used for a long time. It ensures the gradual achievement of greater budgetary 
transparency on a pragmatic and flexible basis and with due regard for the 
budgetary powers of the Institutions. 
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VI 
SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGETS 
Draftsman Mr Heinrich AIGNER 
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INTRODUCTION 
1 1. The principle of annual budgets is intended to allow the budgetary 
authority to take political decisions in the light of an overall consideration 
of all budgetary appropriations. 
'J'he .-.pplic,1l io11 or lhi:; p1·i11cipll·, undt'r which approprL:itions arc 
granted annually and may not be ullercd during the financial year, gives 
rise to problems on account of its inflexibility and its necessarily arbitrary 
nature. 
2. These difficulties are especially likely to arise because of events 
occurring during the year which have financial implications., requiring a 
quick budgetary decision the need for which was not apparent.at the time of 
the annual decision on the budget. In such cases it is normal practice for 
the budgetary authority to make an exception and alter the content of the 
annual decision through the instrument of a supplemmtary or rectifying 
budget. It is also clear that only that authority may be given this right. 
From the purely theoretical point of view, the procedure of supplementary 
and rectifying budgets may be understood as a mechanism that provides the 
necessary flexibility in connection with the annual decision on the budget 
while preserving the rights and powers of the budgetary authority. 
3. At the same time, the practical application of this procedure during 
the past few years has shown that appropriations have been used for quite 
different purposes, which has detracted from the value of the principle of 
annual budgets and prevented the budgetary decision from being a political 
decision. 
Use of supplementary budgets by the institutions 
4. In accordance with the principle of annual budgets and financial 
regularity, supplementary budgets must be limited to extraordinary and 
unavoidable cases. They must not restrict the power of the budgetary 
authority to fix the content of the budget. 2 
A. Are supplementary budgets the exception? 
5. The most recent opinions on this subject are to be found in the answers 
3 to the questions put by the rapporteur on the 1976 budget. 
1 The expenditure shown in the budget is approved for one financial year except 
where otherwise provided in the financial Regulation provided for in Article 209 
of the EEC Treaty. 
2 It should also be pointed out in this connection that the provisions of the 
Financial Regulation on supplementary and rectifying budgets (Article 1(4)) are 
extremely vague and should be clarified. 
3 Doc. 361/75, rapporteur : Mr COINTAT. 
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The Council considers that supplementary budgets need not be used only 
in exceptional cases. 
I 1 • • 1 , l genera pr1nc1p e 
It considers the use of supplementary budgets as a 
which is well-founded and was used 'on several occasions 
2 in previous years' 
6. The Council considers that supplementary budgets form part of the normal 
procedure, particularly with regard to the EAGGF: since agricultural expen-
diture varies, it considers supplementary budgets as the normal way of making 
the necessary adjustments. 
The Commission, which used this procedure in the field mentioned for 
the first time last year 3, does not consider that supplementary budgets are 
part of the normal procedure. 
B. Are supplementary budgets unavoidable? 
7. Since supplementary budgets are of an exceptional nature, they may be 
used only where they are truly unavoidable. The budgetary decisions contained 
in them may be applied neither under the normal procedures nor within the 
framework of the annual budget, nor as a normal method of amending the annual 
decision on the budget to take cost trends into account (provisional appro-
priations, frozen appropriations, transfers of appropriations, etc.). 
This last point is accepted by all the institutions. Preliminary draft 
supplementary budget No 3/754 , which was submitted by the Commission to in-
crease the staff in its Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation, 
was rejected by the council and Parliament. The reason given was that the 
measures proposed, which were considered unavoidable, could have been carried 
out in other waysr the appropriations available for the financial year in 
progress could have been used in a more rational manner or appropriations 
from the next financial year could have been used in advance. 
8. Opinions differ, however, as to the fixing of the conditions under 
which expenditure should be entered in the annual budget, in other words, 
the conditions under which appropriations may be regarded as 'foreseeable'. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Until recently, the Council's position on both points was very strict. 
Answer to Question 12 (Doc. 361/75) 
Answer to Question 3 (Doc. 361/75) 
See letter from Mr CHEYSSON accompanying the letter of amendment to the 
1976 budget. 
COM(75) 320 final 
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(a) In the council's view, measures involving expenditure must previously 
have been the subject of a formal legislative decision. The Council 
considered that the budgetary decision should in no way prejudice the 
decisions on new Community measures if these measures remained to be 
considered by the legislative authority and if no legal basis to 
warrant their entry in the budget yet existed. 1 
(b) The Council also contended, with regard to action which had already 
been decided upon, that the amount of expenditure should be accurately 
foreseeable. The necessary adjustments during the year should be 
undertaken by means of a supplementary budget. 2 
9. The Commission 3 and Parliament4 had hitherto considered that where 
modifications of expenditure were unforeseeable in detail but were recog-
nizable in terms of the overall financial implications, a contingency 
reserve should be entered in theainual budget in order to avoid supplementary 
budgets. 
10. After the decision had been taken on the 1976 budget, the Commission's 
position on this became less clear and positively ambiguous: 
5 In preljminary draft supplementary budget No 4/75, the Commission 
proposed to provide for a contingency reserve inthe annual budget in order 
to avoid supplementary budgets in the field of agricultural policy; it 
emphasized in doing so that the budgetary implications of the agricultural 
price policy were completely foreseeable. 
On the other hand, at about th~ same time the Commission submitted the 
annual budget for 19766 and made no provision for a reserve, claiming that it 
it was impossible at that stage to foresee the budgetary implications of the 
agricultural price decisiom. It justified this position by referring to the 
council's statement of 23 May 1974, which again recommended the use of sup-
plementary budgets for increases brought about by adjustments to agricultural 
prices. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Answer by the Council to Question 4. 
See the statement contained in the minutes of the council's meeting 
of 23 September 1974. 
See for example the 1975 preliminary dra.ft budget. 
See in particular the resolution on the 1976 draft budget (Doc. 361/75), 
paragraph 13(b) and paragraph 16 of the explanatory statement -
COINTAT report. 
Preliminary draft supplementary and amending budget No 4/75 - COM(75) 
476, page 2· of general introduction. 
Letter of amendment to the preliminary draft general budget - letter by 
Mr CHEYSSON, page 2. 
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11. In individual cases, however, the Council seems once more to have 
departed recently from its restrictive viewpoint, since during the second 
reading of the draft budget for 1976 it suggested that certain 
appropriations should be included in the budget as a kind of reserve, 
although no decisions had yet been taken on the use of those appropriations. 1 
c. Implications of supplementary budgets for the power of the budgetary 
authority to decide the political content of the budget 
12· (a) 2 In practice, supplementary budgets are initiated by a request from 
the Commission to the budgetary authority that the annual budget in 
question be amended. This procedure does not in itself encroach upon 
the powers of the budgetary authority. 
The circumstances under which this request is normally handled, 
however, cause much of the actual substance of the powers of the budgetary 
authority to be lost. 
(b) Supplementary budgets givea false overall impression of the 
appropriations entered. An overall view, however, is essential for a 
political decision. 
Generally, supplementary budgets as such call the annual decision on 
the budget into question. This can be tolerated only if the supplementary 
budget can be justified by unforeseeable and unavoidable reasons and if the 
significance of the annual decision remains substantially intact. 
(c) On the other hand, it must be recognized that many supplementary 
budgets adopted during the past few years were foreseeable when the 
preliminary draft of the annual budget was drawn up. For example, before 
the 1975 budget was adopted it was already apparent that supplementary 
budgets would be necessary for the Regional Fund and for urgent measures 
in development aid policy and agricultural policy, for which the necessary 
appropriations had been entered in the preliminary draft. 3 
1see in particular Amendment No. 84. 
2contrary to the provisions of Article 1(4) of the Financial Regulation, 
which limits the right of initiative of the Commission in this case and 
stipulates that preliminary draft supplementary budgets must be submitted 
on a proposal from the Assembly, Council or Court of Justice. 
3see preliminary draft supplementary and amending budget No. 4/75 (COM(75) 
476, general introduction, page 3) 
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(d) Finally, the systematic use of supplementary budgets seriously 
disturbs the continuity of the multi-annual Community policies which as 
a result follow an undesirably erratic course. 
13. Under these circumstances, the annual decision on the budget must be 
considered incomplete. With this procedure the annual decision on the budget 
is limited to expenditure which has already been decided elsewhere. The 
budget thus loses significance and becomes a mere sunmary of accounts. 
The result is that the decision on the budget essentially covers only a 
part of the foreseeable expenditure and the volume of the budget is 
artificially reduced. For example, the 1973 budget, which amounted to 
4,245 mu.a., was incre.1sed by over 20% in four supplementary budgets and 
reached a total of 5,134 mu.a. The supplementary budgets thus conceal 
important increases in expenditure. 
14. This procedure was harmful enough when the budget was still adopted by 
the Coun::il. Today, however, such a procedure is no longer acceptable, 
since the Council would in effect be able to reduce the transparency of 
the budget adopted by Parliament, which is responsible to the citizens of 
the Community. 
15. It is a feature of supplementary budgets that they involve a fresh 
decision on expenditure that has already been fixed. It is clear that the 
procedure outlined above tends to impart to legislative decisions a more 
important place than the decision on the budget. This temptation is 
understandable, if one considers that legislative decision;are firmly 
in the hands of the Council, whereas its influence over the budgetary 
decision appears to be dwindling. 
The draftsman considers it appropriate for the legislative and 
budgetary functions to be coordinated. That does not mec11, however, 
that the latter should be subordinated to the ·former. 
16. The present practice with regard to supplementary budgets, however, 
reflects the helplessness of the Council and its inability to take planned 
decisions except under the pressure of urgent events. 
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Conclusions 
The general considerations outlined above pennit us to draw a number 
of conclusions. These should fonn the subject of consultation with the 
Council, which must be asked to give appropriate undertakings. 
(a) First of all, a clear distinction should be made between supplementary 
budgets and rectifying budgets. 
Supplementary budgets relate to unavoidable and unforeseeable 
expenditure arising from external events beyond our control occurring 
during the year in progress. A natural catastrophe is a typical 
example of a situation in which a supplementary budget might be 
necessary. 
Rectifying budgets concern not the overall amount of expenditure but 
its allocation, and involve transfers of appropriations without 
introducing new measures. 
This distinction allows a much more restrictive attitude towards 
supplementary budgets. 
Furthennore, the rectifying budget as defined above is a method by 
which Parliament may exercise its budgetary power of co-decision in 
those fields where its role is at present purely advisory. 
(b) In practice, when a new Commission proposal has financial implications 
for the current financial year, it must be accompanied by a decision 
modifying the budget, i.e. either a rectifying budget or a supplementary 
budget, as appropriate. 
(c) Supplementary budgetsmust be avoided as far as possible. The original 
budget must therefore be comprehensive and include everything that is 
foreseeable. In the specific case of expenditure arising from the 
fixing of agricultural prices, it is possible to lay down guidelines 
in the annual budget. 
The annual budget should not be divided into instalments; fr.should 
be the instrument of a genuine budgetary and financial policy, one 
which is comprehensive and autonomous. 
- There must be an orthodox budgetary procedure appropriate to the 
principle of own resources: expenditure should be linked to a 
'revenue' section fixed tor the current year. 
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- Finally, the following procedures would allow these principles to be 
implemented: 
• entry inthe annual budget of appropriations frozen under Chapter 98 
'non-allocated provisional appropriations'; 
• entry in the annual budget of appropriations frozen under individual 
budget headings; 
• more systematic use of the entry of commitment appropriations; 
• entry under individual chapter headings of provisional appropriations 
for unforeseeable events; 
• use of borrowing authorizations; 
• better use of cash resources and advances. 
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VII 
BUDGETARY NOMENCLATURE 
Draftsman: Mr COINTAT 
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REVIEW OF THE BUDGETARY NOMENCLATURE 
1. In the course of the procedure leading to the adoption of the draft 
budget for 1976, Parliament discovered various inadequacies in the nomen-
clature used for the Community budget. While the procedure was still 
under way, it succeeded in having some amendments to the nomenclature 
adopted but felt, like the Council, that a further review was necessary 
and that the matter should be considered jointly with the budgetary 
authority during the first quarter of 19761 • 
2. The working party's instructions to the draftsman were therefore to 
propose practical improvements to the nomenclature in order to facilitate 
and clarify the procedure for authorizing expenditure. This document will, 
like other working documents adopted by the working party, be submitted to 
the Committee on Budgets and will then serve as a basis for a dialogue 
between the Parliament and the Council. 
0 
0 0 
3. Before considering the nature of these improvements, it should be 
determined which authority is responsible for implementing them and under 
what procedure. The texts in force provide for two different procedures 
depending on whether the nomenclature is supplemented or amended: 
- the nomenclature may be supplemented within the framework of the budgetary 
procedure as provided for in Article 15(4) of the Financial Regulation: 
'4. The budgetary nomenclature annexed to this Regulation shall 
be mandatory in respect of apportionment of revenue and expenditure 
under separate titles, chapters and articles. Where necessary, it 2 
may be supplemented within the framework of the budgetary procedure' 
- it may be amended by legislative means in accordance with Article 209 of 
the Treaty: 
'The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission: 
(a) make financial regulations specifying in particular the procedure 
to be adopted for establishing and implementing the budget and 
for presenting and auditing accounts ( ••• ) '. 
1 Paragraph 2 of the Resolution of the EP, 
OJ No. C7, 12.1.1976, rapporteur: Mr COINTAT 
:2 OJ No. L 116, 1.5.1973, p. 7 
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4. If the nomenclature is supplemented, it is therefore the budgetary 
authority that decides: in practice this should mean that the decision lies 
with Parliament, which has the last word on all amendments to the budget 
except for amendments to gompulsory expenditure. 
If the Financial Regulation, and thus the nomenclature, is amended, 
it is the Council alone that decides. It must, however, be added that the 
budget treaty now being ratified provides for consultation of Parliament 
and, moreover, that the conciliation procedure is now to be applied in the 
event of the Financial Regulation being amended. 
5. The legal boundary between 'supplement' and 'amendment' is a very 
narrow one. It may be felt, however, that there is a certain logic in 
giving preference to the role of the budgetary authority for af¥alteration 
of nomenclature that determines the very form of the budget. Experience 
suggests, moreover, that it is the budgetary authority that is more com-
petent in matters of nomenclature: during the adoption of the 1976 draft 
budget, the European Parliament succeeded in having various supplements 
and amendments to the nomenclature adopted on the final reading despite 
opposition from the Council1 • Since the Council did not question 
Parliament's competence and right to the last word on the matter, this 
may be regarded as a sort of precedent.2 
6. The legal ambiguity of this situation should in fact lead the three 
institutions concerned to seek an informal agreement prior to any 
'improvement' of the nomenclature: it would then be of little importance 
whether the improvement was made by legislative or budgetary means. It 
is only for the lack of such an agreement that the procedure for amendment 
would assume its full importance and that Parliament would have to find 
arguments for using the budgetary method. It is nevertheless still the 
case that any amendment to the nomenclature during the budget vote could 
prove to be as complex and difficult as was the case with the 1976 budget. 
0 
0 0 
7. The Financial Regulation should be revised both vertically and 
horizontally: 
1 
2 
- with the vertical layout of the budget columns, figures can be 
entered for several financial years. There are three columns in 
the budget documents (preliminary draft/draft/adopted budget) for 
appropriations for the finarx:ial year under consideration (n), 
appropriations for the current financial year (n-1), and expenditure 
See amendments to Title v, Chapters SO to 54, Social Fund 
When the Financial Regulation is next revised Parliament should insist 
that budgetary nomenclature should be decided by the budgetary authority 
alone as part of the procedure whereby the budget is adopted. 
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for the preceding financial year (n-2). The Conunittee on Budgets 
has already expressed its intention to supplement this presentation; 
- horizontally, the budget is subdivided into titles, chapters, 
articles and items. Here, various improvements may be e,!·.,isaged, 
mainly for the purpose of grouping together some items that are too 
diversified, breaking down articles that cover too much expenditure1 , 
and clarifying certain situations. 
A. VERTICAL CHANGES IN THE NOMENCLATURE 
8. The purpose of such changes would be to facilitate and supplement the 
reading of the columns for the various financial years under consideration. 
Several amendments may be envisaged here in order to supplement the 
information given in the vertical columns. 
The following could for instance be proposed: 
1. in_the_ereliminarr_draft_and_draft_bud2ets: add a column showing the 
estimates of expenditure for the current financial year (n-1); 
2. in_the_draft bud2et: add a column showing the amount of 
appropriations proposed by the Conunission in the preliminary 
draft. 
1In this connection, it might be proposed, for instance, that budgetary 
items amounting to less than 100,000 u.a. should not be created and 
that those amounti·ng to more than ·SO m u.a. should be subdivided. 
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B. HORIZONTAL CHANGES IN THE NOMENCLATURE 
9. Many more improvements are possible here. The main 
ones concern 
- research and investment appropriations 
- the Regional Fund 
- the EAGGF, Guarantee Section 
- Title 9. 
Other minor amendments may also be considered; and these are 
swmnarized further down. 
(a) Research_and_investment_aEErOEriations (Article 330) 
(approx. 135m u.a. for 1976) 
10. These appropriations are currently grouped together under 
a single budget article and are then given in detail in an annex 
(Volume V) which is particularly difficult to understand. For 
this reason, the power of amendment of the budgetary authority -
and of the European Parliament in particular - is in practice 
limited since total appropriations cannot be easily amended 
(Article 330) if the various components are not ~!early listed. 
To remedy this situation it would suffice to repeat in the Commission 
budget (Volume IV) the main items of expenditure (in this case the 
9 titles) of the annex (Volume V). Article 330 would then be 
subdivided into 9 items showing the appropriations proposed for 
each of the 9 titles of the annex; it would then be easier for the 
budgetary authority to asses and amend the appropriations; 
(b) Re9ional_Fund_a~Er~riations (Article 550) 
11. These appropriations amount to 300m u.a. for payment grouped 
together under a single article, which makes it practically 
impossible to exercise the right of amendment in a balanced way; 
the right of amendment can be used only in a general and 
approximate fashion. Now, it appears that the Fund is intended 
to finance three specific forms of regional investment: 
- investment in industrial, craft and service 
activities; 
- investment in infrastructures for these activities; 
- investment in infrastructures for hill-farming and 
less-favoured areas. 
It is thus possible to envisage the creation under 
Article 550 of 3 separate items on each of which the 
budgetary authority would deliver a separate opinion. 
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(c) EAGGF, Guarantee Section (Titles 6 and 7) 
------------------------
12. In this section of the budget 10 items alone represent more than 40% of 
total appropriations, without any more details being given for them than for 
other budget items. Here there can be no question of creating new items since 
they are already sufficiently differentiated: instead an explanation should be 
given of the appropriations proposed. The method of calculating EAGGF, 
Guarantee Section, appropriations could, for instance, be explained in the 
remarks column of titles 6 and 7: amount of aid per unit multiplied by the 
estimated volume of production. This supplementary information would make it 
easier to assess whether requests for appropriations are justified. It could 
also quite well be included in the explanatory statement in the preliminary 
draft budget, but it seems preferable to include it opposite the budget entry 
so that the appropriations and their justification can be read simultaneously. 
(d) Aid to developing countries (Title 9) 
---------------------------
13. In the present nomenclature Title 9 groups together appropriations for 
aid to developing countries and 'other expenditure' - in other words, 
provisional appropriations (not allocated or not specifically provided for). 
It is advisable to separate these two categories of appropriations 
and to devote a specific title to aid expenditure alone, 'other expenditure' 
being shown under a different title. 
Moreover, it is becoming urgent to set out the aid appropriations more 
coherently. At present they are subdivided into three chapters: 
- Food aid (Chapter 92) 
- Special cooperation measures (Chapter 93) 
- Exceptional measures to assist developing 
countries (Chapter 94) 
14. As a result of developments in the Community's development aid policy, 
this nomenclature already appears to be out-of-date and a new lay-out could 
be proposed along the following lines: 
Chapter 90: Financial and technical cooperation with associated countries 
Chapter 91: Financial and technical cooperation with countries that 
have concluded cooperation agreements with the Community 
Chapter 92: Financial and technical cooperation with other developing 
countries 
Chapter 93: Special measures for financial and technical cooperation 
Chapter 94: Special measures to assist developing countries 
Chapter 95: Food aid 
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15. It should be noted that this is merely an example, given the changing 
nature of this sector of Community activity and the continuing uncertainty 
about the budgetization of certain appropriations intended as aid to 
developing countries. Moreover, this model would have to be radically 
changed if the principle of budgetization of the EDF were adopted one day. 
(e) Provisional_a;e;ero;eriations (Chapters 98 and 99) 
16. As we have seen above, it would be advisable to separate these 
appropriations from those intended as aid for developing countries and to 
group them under a separate new title (Title 10). The nature of both 
categories of appropriation would also have to be clarified: 
- provisional appropriations not allocated (Chapter 98) 
- expenditure not specifically provided for (Chapter 99) 
17. As far as Chapter 98 is concerned, it is paradoxical to talk of 
appropriations not allocated when these appropriations~ in fact allocated 
since they can be transferred only to specific items when the budget is 
adopted; the term 'not allocated' should therefore be dispensed with. 
As regards the appropriations for 'expenditure not specifically provided 
for' (Chapter 99) their raison d'~tre and the use to which they are in fact 
put remains somewhat of a mystery. 
(f) Other_;eossible_amendments 
18. Careful reading of the budget nomenclature (especially Volume IV, 
commission) reveals numerous inaccuracies, not to say anomalies, of which the 
most important are as follows: 
Article 224: operating cost of the computer centre: the three items 
of expenditure do not meet with the wishes of the European 
Parliament, which at the end of its study of the computer 
centre had requested the inclusion of two supplementary 
items, so that there could be clear differentiation between 
expenditure on the hire of computers and expenditure on 
external services; 
Article 251: expenditure for formal meetings and meetings in general: 
all the committees set up within the EEC are listed on two pages 
of remarks; it would be preferable to show under four budget 
items only the four groups of committees and to enter the 
proposed appropriations for each; 
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Article 350: radiation protection: this is a typical example of 
unnecessary multiplication of items since an appropriation of 
220,000 u.a. alone is spread over six items when it could be 
covered by one. 
Chapter 43: European schools: a large appropriation (16m u.a. in 1976) 
is devoted to subsidies for the six European schools. A more 
practical and detailed presentation of these appropriations 
would enable the budgetary authority better to assess their 
usefulness and justification. 
0 
0 0 
CONCLUSIONS 
19. The improvements suggested above are of a fairly general nature and 
are subject to a joint agreement on the part of the budgetary authority, 
regardless of the procedure for the adoption of the 1977 draft budget. 
They may also be helpful to the budgetary authority when it considers 
the preliminary draft budget for 1977 and possibly decides that it is 
necessary to adapt the nomenclature for that financial year. 
At that stage, it will also be more convenient to raise certain 
additional questions - relating, for example, to blocked appropriations 
and token entries, as well as to the nature and role of the remarks. 
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VIII 
BUDGETARY TRANSPARENCY 
Draftsman: Mr GERLACH 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. By the standard definition of budgetary transparency the budget 
should be so clear and understandable as to reveal plainly the purpose of 
expenditure, why it is estimated at a certain level and how the 
appropriations are used. A budget that is clear and easy to read is 
essential for the budgetary authority to be able to exercise its powers 
fully, which it does through co-decision in the process of drawing up the 
budget and through control of budgetary expenditure. 
2. The transparency of the budget is impaired, however, when a large 
number of decentralized Community activities are financed from block 
appropriations, giving rise to mini-budgets which are more or less 
1 
autonomous 
3. In carrying out his mandate, the draftsman visited six institutions 
presenting problems of this type - the Statistical Office, the Office for 
Official Publications, the Computer Centre, the Euratom Supply Agency, the 
European Cooperation Association (ECA) and the Business Cooperation Centre2 
and discussed certain matters with those in charge, in particular budgetary 
d . d . 3 Th expen iture an accounting e draftsman considers that this basic 
information is indispensable. In their absence, general recommendations on 
the transparency of the budget of the Communities would have to remain 
theoretical and without solid foundation. 
4. From the plethora of complex individual cases the following baslc 
problems can be deduced: 
1 
I. Organizational and legal forms of decentralization of certain 
Community activities 
II. Its effects on the budgetary policy of the Communities, in 
particular on budgetary transparency 
III. Management of Community Funds and budgetary transparency 
See, for example, Articles 301, 307, 359, 420, 421, 422, 423, 440. 
2 For the financial provisions applying to the European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training and to the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions see the draftsman's report on 
this subject (PE 42 .862) • 
3 Defore making these fact-finding visits, the draftsman sent out question-
naires which were answered in writing. These questions and answers go 
into some detail and are available on request to members of the working 
party. 
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IV. The annual budget and multi-annual action programmes 
v. Internal accounting and charging for services supplied to 
outside organizations 
VI. comparisons between costs and performance in the non-profit-
making public sector 
VII. Standardization of the multiplicity of financial regulations 
in order to achieve greater transparency 
VIII. Budgetary transparency and control by the European Parliament. 
While not claiming to be comprehensive, the following remarks -
relating essentially to practical problems - are designed to stimulate 
discussion on these points. 
I. Organizational and legal forms of decentralization of certain 
community activities 
S. As a result of the setting of specific tasks, performance of such 
tasks on an inter-institutional basis or political exigencies, certain areas 
of community action are not organized in normal administrative units with 
income and revenue included in the usual way in the budget of the 
institution concerned, but in separate decentralized units which have very 
different legal forms. (The question whether a specific organizational 
structure of this type is always rendered imperative by material 
circumstances must remain open.) 
6. The statistical office1 and the Business Cooperation Centre2, for 
example, are administrative units which, are fully integral parts of the 
commission's organization. The Statistical Office is peculiar in that it 
concludes with Member States or experts very far-reaching agreements that 
have financial implications. The Statistical Office also has a separate 
:· section in Brussels. 
1. The Office1 for Official Publications has an interinstitutional form 
of organization, and therefore also has a certain amount of budgetary 
autonomy, a fact that scarcely contributes to the transparency of the 
community budget. Nevertheless, the area of activity concerned requires a 
flexible policy in regard to staff which is not possible under Community 
regulations. 
1 'Office' does not however necessarily imply individual legal personality. 
2 Attached for administrative purposes to Directorate-General III (Industrial 
and Technological Affairs) of the Conunission. 
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8. The Office for Official Publications is a good example of an under-
taking governed by public law in which officials are engaged in activities 
outside the province of a civil service. For this reason it has often been 
asked whether the Office should not be transformed into an enterprise 
governed by private law. It is obvious that these decentralized forms of 
organization give rise to a number of problems with regard to the trans-
parency of the budget. 
9. The fundamental question which must therefore be asked is in what 
cases do practical and functional considerations make it essential for 
community activities to be decentralized. Only in these cas~s should a 
devolved form of organization be accepted. 
A principle can be established whereby those Community bodies which 
carry out purely advisory work do not require a decentralized structure 
or individual legal personality or any special status. 
Mention should be made at this point of the Euratorn Supply Agency. 
Although, pursuant to Article 52 (2b) of the EAEC Treaty, the Agency possesses 
•an exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply of ores, 
source materials and special fissile materials corning from inside the 
Community or from outside', it has never - with the exception of one 
unimportant occasion - exercised this right. The draftsrnan is therefore 
inclined to question the agency's organizational structure. The purely 
advisory work of the agency does not, surely, warrant a separate legal 
personality and financial autonorny1 • 
10. In contrast with the Euratorn Supply Agency, the decentralized organiza-
tional structure of the European Cooperation Association (ECA) can be 
accepted on the basis of the functional criteria postulated above. The 
Association is registered in Belgium as a non-profit making organization 
and therefore finds itself in a very anomalous position; under Belgian law 
the staff are private employees paying Belgian taxes and social security con-
tributions. They are divided into the staff at the headquarters and staff 
in the developing countries who are mainly employed as experts or delegated 
auditors of the Development Fund. In addition, 23 members of staff are 
paid from the resources of the ECA although they are employed under private 
law at the Commission (DG VIII). 
1 Article 54 (1) of the EAEC Treaty, which establishes this legal position, 
would therefore seem to be in need of revision. 
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The Association's organizational structure can also be seen in another 
light since it has the difficult task of administering a widely dispersed 
staff with speed and efficiency. 
II. Effects of decentralization on the budgetary policy of the 
Communities, in particular on budgetary transparency 
11. The existence of such divergent types of organization is naturally 
detrimental to clear presentation of the budget. 
For example, although the Computer Centre's activities are inter-institutional, 
its revenue and expenditure, like those of the Statistical Office, are 
incorporated in the budget of the Commission, and its expenditure is not in 
all cases distinguished from other Commission expenditure. It may therefore 
be doubted whether the principle of individual appropriations - as required 
for the purposes of budgetary transparency - has been respected. (Both 
agencies have the power to conclude agreements with financial implications). 
12. To take a further example, the Office for Official Publications, 
according to a memorandum from the Directorate-General for Budgets1, no 
longer wishes to have its revenue and expenditure incorporated in the 
various chapters of the Commission's budget, but would like a single overall 
title and an appropriate informative appendix. It justifies this on account 
of the greater budgetary clarity which would supposedly result from it (~). 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the budgetary authority can agree to 
this limitation of powers. 
13. The Community institutions mentioned so far have - as stated above -
one point in common: they have multiple contractual relations with external 
bodies (Member States, printers, experts). This not inconsiderable use of 
funds is only included in the budget in aggregate. Where this money goes and 
and whether it is spent prudently remains largely unknown to the budgetary 
authority. The inevitable consequences of this situation are that, for 
example, printing cartels are set up, information on contracts is refused on 
account of the commercial nature of the activity, sliding-price clauses are 
introduced in anticipation and price increases during the term of the contract 
become the rule2 • Similarly, computers and whole staffs are contracted out. 
1 Memorandum of 15.12.1975 to the Secretary-General of the Commission. 
2 See the Audit Board's report on the accounts for the financial year 1974, 
paragraph 49. pp. 54 et seq. 
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The Committee on Budgets must consider whether it can accept these anomalies, 
particularly in view of the supervisory functions it is required to assume. 
14. The Euratom Supply Agency and the Cooperation Association receive 
global subsidies which, in the case of the Supply Agency, take the place of 
the charge provided for in the agreement and which is not in fact levied. 
As stated above, this type of procedure is unsatisfactory since the 
budgetary authority is given no information on how money is subsequently 
spent. Inevitably, unexplained movements of staff take place which are 
necessary to make good deficiencies in the staff complement and adequate 
supervision becomes impossible. 
III. Management of the Community Funds and budgetary transparency 
15. This section is not intended to explain the management of Community 
Funds and it could not do so. However, the draftsman has, by way of 
example, looked at the budgetary aspect of the Social Fund and the EAGGF 
and discovered two large problem areas which will have to receive greater 
attention in future if we are to arrive at a more satisfactory budgetary 
transparency. These are 'information for the decision-maker' and·~-
ponsibility of the Commission'. 
16. The information which the budgetary authority has on the management 
of Funds is particularly sketchy and makes a clear assessment impossible. 
The electronic data processing system has still not been put into service 
and it is surprising to discover that the Computer Centre has for some time 
left some programming jobs for the Guidance Section untouched although it 
is well known that the Centre is still working below full capacity. 
A systems analysis for the application of data processing techniques 
in the administration of agricultural markets has been carried out. A 
harmonization directive will shortly be submitted for the Social Fund in 
order to approximate national legislation, and this will facilitate the 
introduction of data processing. 
Clear accounting, i.e. profit and loss figures, lists of errors and 
indicators to show up irregularities and the supply of information needed 
when drawing up the new budget could be substantially improved by the use 
of data processing. 
17. According to the annuality principle, only that revenue which is 
likely to be spent during the financial year can be entered in the budget. 
A poor example of this is the 'Mansholt Reserve' (once simply the structural 
instrument in the 'Mansholt Plan'. It is included in the budget as a token 
entry, but every year amounts are used from this reserve for purposes which 
no longer have anything to do with the 'Mansholt Reserve' as such. A 
nonsense has been made of this fundamental concept. 
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18. The particularly important areas corresponding to the budgetary 
principles of unity and clarity, i.e. the inclusion of all Funds in the 
budget, have already been examined in other working documents and need not 
be repeated here. It must, however, be noted that Parliament will continue 
to have limited powers of co-decision as long as the management of the 
community's finances tolerates a jumbled up conglomorate of unconnected 
Funds outside the budget which are financed in different ways and which make 
a transparent and comprehensive appraisal impossible. 
IV. The annual budget and multi-annual action programmes 
19. This general problem can be well illustrated with reference to the 
planning of the activities of the Statistical Office (e.g. investigations 
linked to progranunes) or the Office for Official Publications (e.g. 
publications appearing over a number of years). 
20. Representatives of the Statistical Office have explained to the drafts-
man that the statistical programmes are not set up until late in the 
financial year, not only because of inherent factors but also because of 
technical shortcomings in coordination. Consequently even the external 
contracts with the statistical authorities and offices of the Member States 
or with experts who work for the Office may be concluded very late in the day. 
Another effect is the delay in the utilization of budgetary appropriations 
and in the outflow of funds. Also, in many cases, payments are made in two 
stages, i.e. a payment in advance and a final payment on completion of the work. 
The result of this timelag is that, almost without exception, total payments 
do not correspond to cost estimates. 
21. The results with regard to the implementation of the budget are as 
follows: 
unusually high proportion of transfers1 
recourse to non-allocated provisional appropriations (Chapter 98) 
the tendency to use commitment authorizations 
22. Factors inherent in the planning of activities must not be allowed 
to destroy budgetary transparency and undermine other principles, such as 
that the budget should be annual and itemized. These are of the greatest 
importance if the European Parliament is to assert its budgetary powers 
fully. The budget must be adapted and dovetailed to the pattern of multi-
annual activity planning. It must nevertheless be ensured that programmes 
lasting several years do not prejudice the annual decision on the budget. 
1 Audit Board's report on the accounts for the financial year 1974, 
paragraph 36. 
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v. Internal accounting and charging for services supplied to outside 
organizations 
23. The area under investigation ought to be extended to include the 
administration of cash resources and accounts - and should thus not be 
confined to the budget docume~t as such - in order to achieve greater trans-
parency here as well. 
24. Internal accounts ought to set out how the total expenditure of the 
conununity is distributed between the individual institutions. Since the 
conununity budget is broken down by institution, failure to take account of 
exchanges of goods or services would result in a management system out of 
step with the budget. 
25. On the other hand, if administration is to be as simple and efficient 
as possible, unnecessary work in connection with internal settlements should 
be avoided. For example, the Office for Official Publications charges the 
institutions for the services it supplies to them. However, it transfers back 
50% of the proceeds from the sales of its publications1 . 
26. In future, a close watch will also have to be kept on charging for 
services supplied to outside bodies if the necessary clarity is to be achieved. 
For example, the Computer Centre intends to supply data to the University of 
Paris against payment. The policy of the Business Cooperation Centre is not 
to charge for its services. The Euratom Supply Agency ought to receive 
payment for its services but is instead given a subsidy from the budget. 
VI. comparisons between costs and performance in the non-profit-making 
public sector 
27. The usefulness of services in the non-profit-making public sector 
(Computer Centre, Office for Official Publications, Statistical Office) 
cannot be measured in terms of figures. Furthermore, the costs are so to 
speak 'always covered.' However, it is possible to undertake a cost analysis 
comparing performance with expenditure. 
In all those areas of Conununity activity which are not concerned with 
government or administration but where business criteria have to be applied, 
cost structures ought to be created. The Office for Official Publications 
has made a start on this with its analytical accounting system. This still 
has to be considerably improved, however, before it becomes an efficient 
1Audit Board's report on the accounts for the financial year 1974, 
paragraph 36 
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instrument of cost comparison1• Unless certain activities are costed and 
cost-effectiveness analyses are carried out in this area of budget imple-
mentation, the budget loses all meaning, because the appropriation, do not 
show what is actually achieved through the use of the funds. This 
undoubtedly limits the budgetary authority's ability to exercise its control 
function. 
VII. Standardization of the multiplicity of financial regulations in 
order to achieve greater transparency 
28. until now the implementation of the budget has not satisfied the 
minimum requirements of budgetary transparency even in terms of legal 
system. A separate financial regulation is created for almost every 
new decentralized institution2 • The budgetary authority is thus 
confronted with an impenetrable legal tangle of th6 most disparate financial 
regulations. 
29, It therefore seems necessary to establish unifor~ legal rules for 
the whole financing machinery. We can no longer go along with the 
council in creating new systems for revenue and expenditure for each 
new activity of the Community. A systematic legal structure is 
required followed by harmonization of the unnecessary divergencies 
in the types of financial regulation. 
VIII. Budget transparency and control by the European Parliament 
30. From the draftsman's remarks on the present situation, it is 
possible to reach a conclusion on the future control activity of the 
European Parliament: the budgetary authority must find a middle path 
between involving itself in the administrative details of budget imple-
mentation or. the one hand, and allowing lack of transparency to impair the 
exercise of its control function on the other. The transparency of the 
budget decreases the more decentralized the activities of the Communities 
become. This must not lead to a budgetary policy that is impossible 
to follow or understand, nor may it make budgetary central more difficult 
than it is. 
1This would also provide a basis for calculating production costs in 
w~ere the.community has to fix (Official Journal) or intends to fix 
(1nformat1on booklets) prices for its services or products. 
cases 
2 
E.g. European Vocational Training Centre, Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions. 
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31. In order to prepare for future control activity, it is vital to 
create a transparent budget showing all important financial data in a 
single informative document and to construct a transparent system for 
the implementation of the budget both in legal and organizational terms. 
The latter aspect must on no account be neglected. 
32. In this connection it must be stressed that the Commission should 
not be allowed to escape the responsibility it bears, pursuant to Article 
205, first paragraph, of the Treaty, with regard to the utilization of 
Fund appropriations. It should not allow its authority in this area to 
be undermined by the activities of the management committees. This is 
of decisive importance for the budgetary authority's control activities, 
which become less effective when decisions are left to the states to sort 
out among themselves. 
CONCLUSIONS 
33. In order to achieve greater transparency in ~he budget of the Communities 
and in the implementation of the budget, the following measures need. 
urgently to be taken. 
34. Functional pruning of all decentralized bodies and administrative units 
of the community. Partial financial auton~my an~ separate legal personality 
should only be granted in cases where these are dictated by the activities 
in question and operational factors. Purely advisory activity does not 
require a de~olvcd form of organization and administrative structure 
(e.g. _Euratom Supply Agency). 
35. In cases where decentralized administration is fu~ctionally necessary, 
the following are required for the purposes of greater budgetary clarity: 
- the staff must be included in a separate establishrnen~ plan which must 
form an integrated part of the overall budget of the Communities. Here an 
unnecessary multiplicity of types of conditions of employment (according 
to national law, etc.) must be avoided. Officials, temporary staff and 
local staff ought to be sufficient to meet the employment requirements 
(cf. situation in the ECA) 
- contractuaL relations with outside bodies must be subject to effective 
scrutiny by the budgetary authority. This applies particularly to the Office 
for Official Publications, the Statistical Office and the Computer Centre. 
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36. The Community's multi-annual action programmes must be coordinated with 
the annual budget without damaging the continuity of these programmes or 
limiting the budgetary powers of the European Parliament. 
37. Internal accounting between the various institutions and organs of the 
community must be restricted to a minimum. The desire for budgetary clarity 
must not lead to unnecessary administrative costs. 
38. comparisons between costs and performance ought in the future to make it 
possible for the budgetary authority to exercise greater control over 
efficiency. 
39. For greater clarity in the area of implementation of the budget the 
individual financial regulations that exist for the decentralized offices 
must be standardized. This could perhaps take the form of an outline 
financial regulation. 
40. More information ought to be made available to the decision-maker in the 
area of the management of Community Funds by the introduction of electronic 
data processing. Only with data processing will Parliament be in a position 
to exercise efficient control over the complex activities of the Funds. 
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